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The Walking Dead: How the Criminal
Regulation of Sodomy Survived Lawrence v.
Texas
Jordan Carr Peterson*

ABSTRACT
Eighteen years after the Supreme Court held in Lawrence v. Texas that a
law criminalizing sodomy violated the constitutional guarantee to substantive
due process, individuals are still arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and
incarcerated pursuant to statutes that are the material equivalent of the one at
issue in Lawrence. Though this seems both strange and unfair, it is neither
unusual nor accidental. Because the constitutional order renders the judiciary
a passive institution and radically fragments authority across a polycentric
collection of governments, noncompliance with judicial decisions is endemic to
American institutional design.
While the Lawrence decision cast unflagging constitutional disapproval on
statutes criminalizing private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse, multiple
states continue to enforce criminal prohibitions on sodomy on the theory that
Lawrence only proscribes inequitable applications of categorical sodomy bans,
as opposed to leaving them unenforceable entirely. This Article thus represents
the first comprehensive examination of how criminal prohibitions on sodomy
have stubbornly survived their own intended death.
States enforce laws criminalizing sodomy through both direct prosecution
as well as collateral means, namely, by requiring individuals convicted under
bans on consensual sodomy to register as sex offenders. This Article maintains
that a faithful reading of Lawrence demands the wholesale abandonment of laws
facially criminalizing private, consensual sexual intimacy, and recommends the
legislative repeal of programs enabling both direct and collateral enforcement
of categorical prohibitions on sodomy.

*

Jordan Carr Peterson, Assistant Professor of Political Science, School of Public and
International Affairs, North Carolina State University; Ph.D., University of Southern
California (2018); J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law (2012).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 7

858

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................... 857
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................... 859
II. THE REGULATION OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
UNITED STATES ................................................................................ 861
A. Laws Criminalizing Sodomy: A Brief History................................ 861
B. The Affirmation of Sodomy Regulations in Bowers v. Hardwick .... 864
C. Lawrence v. Texas and the Promise of Deregulating Consensual
Sexual Behavior ......................................................................... 865
III. LIFE AFTER LAWRENCE: THE MIRAGE OF AUTOMATIC
INVALIDATION .................................................................................. 870
A. Implementing Judicial Decisions in a Decentralized Polity ........... 871
B. Formal Changes to State Sodomy Prohibitions after Lawrence ..... 876
C. Direct Enforcement of Sodomy Laws After Lawrence ................... 882
D. Collateral Enforcement of Sodomy Laws After Lawrence ............. 887
E. Sodomy Laws and the Persistence of Stigmatization ..................... 895
IV. PATHS FORWARD: HARMONIZING POLICY WITH THE LETTER AND
SPIRIT OF LAWRENCE ......................................................................... 897
A. Legislative Remedies .................................................................... 897
B. Judicial Remedies......................................................................... 899
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 901

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/7

2

Peterson: The Walking Dead: How the Criminal Regulation of Sodomy Survived

2021]

THE CRIMINAL REGULATION OF SODOMY

859

I. INTRODUCTION
“This case thus requires us to decide when the threat of
continued enforcement is enough to reanimate a zombie law and
bring it from the statutory graveyard into federal court.” – Pool
v. City of Houston1
How do laws die? The simplest answer is legislative repeal; if
sufficient majorities in a legislative body agree, existing statutes may be
excised from their jurisdiction’s code by subsequently enacting a repeal
bill.2 The less simple answer is negative judicial review. American courts
famously have the authority – of, some argue, extraconstitutional
provenance3 – to proscribe the enforcement of laws, policies, and practices
enacted or implemented by coordinate public institutions if the reviewing
court deems such actions unconstitutional.4 The power to repeal affords
legislatures the capacity to eliminate laws they disfavor rapidly, while
judicial review sounds a more protracted death knell for unconstitutional

1

Pool v. City of Houston, 978 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2020).
See, e.g., Jordan M. Ragusa & Nathaniel A. Birkhead, Parties, Preferences,
and Congressional Organization: Explaining Repeals in Congress from 1877 to 2012,
68 POL. RES. Q. 745 (2015) (examining congressional repeals of major legislation and
arguing that legislative repeal is more likely given greater agenda control by
legislative majorities and when a party has been in the minority for longer);
Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, After Enactment: The
Lives and Deaths of Federal Programs, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1 (2010) (concluding that
variation in the partisan composition of Congress influences the durability of federal
policy programs); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A
Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002) (assessing the maxim that current legislatures
may not bind future legislatures from enacting policies the current legislature
disfavors, including but not limited to repealing the current legislature’s own
legislation).
3
See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (arguing that the framers did not intend federal
courts to have the power of judicial review whatsoever); but see SYLVIA SNOWISS,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990) (suggesting the
ratifying generation intended to grant courts the power of judicial review but that their
aim was for such ability to be seldom exercised); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1128–46 (1987) (contending that the
original understanding of the American political order permitted judicial invalidation
of legislative enactments not only on constitutional grounds, but also based on a host
of other moral and ethical principles).
4
See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). While the conventional
wisdom and much scholarship suggests Marbury was the first instance of judicial
review by the Supreme Court, more recent research suggests a more robust tradition
of judicial review in the pre–Marbury early republic. William Michael Treanor,
Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005).
2
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laws and policies because court decisions are not self-executing.5 To wit,
although American courts enjoy expansive prerogative to participate in
forming public policy by passing constitutional judgment on legislative or
regulatory decisions, they lack the ability to ensure officials and
institutions will adhere to their commands.6 Consequently, though a
judicial pronouncement that a given statute or class of statutes facially
violates the Constitution likely spells the functional end for the laws in
question, the peculiarities of American institutional design furnish them
with an escape hatch to a fruitful afterlife.
In 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Lawrence v.
Texas that a Texas statute imposing criminal prohibitions on individuals
who engage in same-sex sexual intimacy violated the substantive
guarantees of due process by infringing on individuals’ constitutional
rights to liberty and privacy.7 The decision engendered, however, neither
the automatic repeal of state statutes criminalizing sodomy at the time
Lawrence was decided, nor the cessation of police, prosecutorial, and
administrative practices enforcing criminal prohibitions on sodomy. 8
While several state legislatures formally repealed their sodomy bans after
Lawrence, this decision was not immediate.9 Even now in some states that
elected not to repeal their statutes criminally prohibiting sodomy after
Lawrence, the imposition of criminal sanctions and administrative burdens
pursuant to sodomy bans proceeds apace. These practices continue as
some courts postulate that Lawrence only constrains the application of
blanket prohibitions on sodomy to private, consensual sex, rather than
enjoining the enforcement of such statutes altogether.10 Any hope, then,
that Lawrence would instantaneously render statutes criminalizing private,
consensual sexual conduct inoperable – what I call the mirage of automatic
invalidation – proves quixotic.11
5

See, e.g., Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act § 101, S.900, 106th Congress § 1
(deregulating certain business practices for financial institutions by explicitly
repealing sections 20 and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the
Glass–Steagall Act). In contrast to repeal legislation, it may take months or even years
for negative judicial review to have the court’s intended effect on presumably
unconstitutional practices. See Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myth of Cooper v.
Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1140–53 (2019) (detailing the complicated
implementation process of school desegregation in the years after the remedial holding
in Brown v. Board of Education II requiring desegregation with “all deliberate
speed”).
6
See infra Part II–A.
7
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
8
See infra Parts II–C and II–D.
9
See infra Part II–B.
10
See infra Parts II–C and II–D.
11
See infra Part II–A. The phenomenon I describe as the mirage of automatic
invalidation is similar to what Jonathan Mitchell has elsewhere called the “writ–of–
erasure fallacy,” in reference to the tendency to equate the power of judicial review
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This Article analyzes the legal means through which the criminal
regulation of sodomy has survived its own intended death at the hands of
the Supreme Court and contends that the survival of sodomy bans is
enabled by both linguistic imprecision in the Lawrence decision along
with the decentralized structure of American government. Part I traces the
history of criminal prohibitions on consensual sexual behavior in the
United States, and reads the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, for
all its promise, as vivifying the afterlife of criminal prohibitions on
sodomy. Part II examines the state of sodomy laws after Lawrence, and
details how police, prosecutors, and judges offend the substantive thrust
of that decision through the continued deprivation of rights and liberties
pursuant to statutes that, on their face, violate the Lawrence rule. Part III
offers remedial suggestions for legislative and judicial officials to bring
policy in their jurisdiction into harmony with the letter and spirit of
Lawrence. Part IV concludes by recommending legislation that clearly
proscribes both the direct and collateral enforcement of sodomy bans.

II. THE REGULATION OF CONSENSUAL SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. Laws Criminalizing Sodomy: A Brief History
Certain classes of sexual conduct (whether engaged in publicly or
privately) have been regulated as “crimes against nature” in the United
States and its colonial predecessors in British North America since the
eighteenth century.12 Indeed, the early Puritan settlers in New England –

with an absolute judicial veto on legislation. Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ–of–
Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 951–69 (2018). Whereas Mitchell’s important
research concentrates specifically on correcting the fallacious assumption that judicial
decisions constitutionally disapproving of statutes and preliminary injunctions
forbidding the enforcement of a law erase statutes or suspend their application, as well
as identifying the consequences of the fallacy, I examine in detail the procedural
mechanisms by which public officials have been able to evade compliance with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence. See id.
12
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY
LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003 (2008) (tracing the history of sodomy regulations in
the United States over time and arguing that reform of statutes prohibiting sodomy
was encumbered by the fragmentation of authority in American government). The first
known anti–sodomy statute in the present-day United States appeared nearly as early
as possible after the establishment of permanent British settlements in North America,
as sodomy – along with rape and adultery – was prohibited as a capital offense by the
colonial code of Virginia enacted in 1610. Id. at 17. Over time, statutes banning
nonprocreative intercourse have gone by different names. Historically, “crime against
nature” was the most common designation, and crime against nature statutes typically
were understood (though did not explicitly enumerate as much) to ban sodomy and
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a group notorious for its willingness to express moral reprobation – have
been said to have “reserved their strongest condemnations for sodomy.”13
These prohibitions, however, were neither English nor Puritan
innovations, instead tracing their ancestry as so many prohibitions do to
the expansive universe of behavioral regulations in the Levitical code.14
While seemingly convinced that crimes against nature advanced any
number of moral interests, legislators responsible for drafting these early
prohibitive statutes predominantly failed to specify with much precision
which sexual behaviors qualified as crimes against nature.15 These
imprecisions, in turn, afforded courts substantial latitude in exactly which
nonprocreative sexual activities statutorily qualified for prohibition. 16
At some point in its history, every U.S. state has imposed criminal
prohibitions on some array of sexual practices legally characterizable as
sodomy, even if such acts occurred between consenting adults.17 Though
statutes regulating so-called crimes against nature originally applied only
to anal intercourse and bestiality, by the end of the nineteenth century
some state legislatures began to alter their criminal codes to include
fellatio in their statutory definition of sodomy.18 In those states whose
legislators did nothing to amend the relevant statutes to criminalize oral
bestiality. In more recently drafted statutes, sodomy is named as the offense. See
generally id.
13
GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW
FROM AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY–FIRST CENTURY 78 (2017).
14
Henry F. Fradella, Legal, Moral, and Social Reasons for Decriminalizing
Sodomy, 18 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 279, 280. Early Judaic law was rather unlike its
ancient Greek and Roman contemporaries in its condemnation of sodomy, but the
spread of Christianity throughout Europe over the course of the last millennium
encouraged the regulation of sexual behavior as both an ecclesiastical as well as a
legal matter. Id. at 281.
15
ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 12, at 2–3. Social scientists
and philosophers posit that a variety of human psychological impulses provide
sufficient enabling conditions for the enactment of sodomy regulations. For instance,
social psychologists have found that the emotion of disgust is strongly associated with
homophobic attitudes, suggesting that disgust at nontraditional sexual behavior likely
also motivates criminalizing homosexual intimacy. See Bunmi O. Olatunji, Disgust,
scrupulosity, and conservative attitudes about sex: Evidence for a mediational model
of homophobia, 42 J. RES. PERSONALITY 1364 (2008). Likewise, scholars have noted
that the judicial and legislative construction of sexually nonconforming practices as
socially undesirable may be driven by the construction of a narrative that associates
sexual nonconformity with predation. Larry Cata Backer, Constructing a
“Homosexual” for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and
Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TUL L. REV. 529, 554–67 (1996).
16
ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 12, at 2–3.
17
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 328–37 (1999).
18
ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 12, at 2, 50–51.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/7

6

Peterson: The Walking Dead: How the Criminal Regulation of Sodomy Survived

2021]

THE CRIMINAL REGULATION OF SODOMY

863

intercourse explicitly, entrepreneurial judges and law enforcement officers
began to interpret extant prohibitions on crimes against nature as
proscribing fellatio.19 As the United States population – and particularly
its gay male population – grew increasingly urban over the course of the
twentieth century, the number of arrests for sodomy rose drastically.20
Recognizing that it represented a serious logistical difficulty for law
enforcement officers to apprehend violators of crime against nature laws
in flagrante delicto,21 jurisdictions increasingly employed criminal
prohibitions on the solicitation of sodomy as well as “degeneracy” to target
both male and female sex workers for surveillance and harassment.22 After
the Stonewall uprising in 1969, and as social and political inequities
experienced by the gay community came into somewhat sharper relief,
enforcement of sodomy prohibitions in many major cities became less
vigorous.23 Whereas prior to Stonewall only Illinois had ceased to impose
criminal sanctions for sodomy as a matter of state law, in the decade
following the uprising sodomy was decriminalized by a further twentyone states.24 Nevertheless, by the 1980s, sodomy remained criminally
punishable in about half of U.S. states, and – as Bowers v. Hardwick would
demonstrate – statutes criminalizing sodomy continued to form the legal
basis for deprivations of liberty as a result of adults engaging in private,
consensual sexual behavior.25

19

Id. at 51. With some regularity, the legal incorporation of fellatio (and, though
less frequently, cunnilingus) into the acts prohibited by crime against nature statutes
proceeded by functionally equating anal and oral sex by grouping them together
conceptually as forms of nonprocreative sexual activity. Id. at 51–53.
20
Id. at 57.
21
This term refers to catching an individual in the act of committing a crime,
and is used with particular frequency to refer to the commission of illegal sex acts.
22
Id. at 57–59.
23
Id. at 166–72; Robert O. Self, Sex in the City: The Politics of Sexual
Liberalism in Los Angeles, 1963–79, 20 GENDER & HISTORY 288 (2008).
24
Melinda D. Kane, Social Movement Policy Success: Decriminalizing State
Sodomy Laws, 1969–1998, 8 MOBILIZATION: AN INT’L Q. 313 (2003). By 1979,
sodomy was decriminalized in Connecticut, Colorado, Oregon, Delaware, Hawaii,
Ohio, New Hampshire, North Dakota, California, Maine, New Mexico, Washington,
Indiana, Iowa, South Dakota, West Virginia, Nebraska, Vermont, Wyoming, Alaska,
and New Jersey, following the initial decriminalization by Illinois in 1961. Id. at 315.
Other states decriminalized on a discriminatory basis: by the time that Bowers v.
Hardwick was decided in 1986, sodomy was decriminalized for different–sex but not
same–sex partners in Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, and
Texas. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 17, at 150.
25
Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching
for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988).
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B. The Affirmation of Sodomy Regulations in Bowers v. Hardwick
Because many states continued to impose criminal sanctions for
sodomy well into the 1980s, a coalition of advocacy organizations joined
lead counsel Laurence Tribe in a facial challenge to the constitutionality
of Georgia’s sodomy statute that was heard before the Supreme Court in
1986.26 In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the Georgia
law criminalizing sodomy did not violate respondent Hardwick’s
constitutional right to privacy as the Constitution does not confer “a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”27 Employing
rational basis review, Justice White, writing for the majority, emphatically
rejected the notion that extant privacy jurisprudence stood “for the
proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting
adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription.”28 By
construing the legal question much more narrowly than the Eleventh
Circuit – which ruled in favor of Hardwick – the majority conceptually
demarcated the conduct rendered criminally punishable by the Georgia
sodomy law as meaningfully different from the sorts of intimate behavior
protected by the constitutional right to privacy.29
In holding that consensual, same-sex sexual activity between adults
was not protected as a fundamental right under substantive due process,30
the Court declined to extend the same sort of privacy-oriented
constitutional protections as they previously had to activities including,
but not limited to, nonprocreative marital intercourse,31 nonprocreative
vaginal intercourse outside of marriage,32 and abortion.33 The Court in
Bowers found its limiting principle by purporting to interpret prior
jurisprudence that protected these other, sufficiently fundamental rights as
representing only the notion that individuals enjoy “a fundamental
individual right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child,”
conveniently disqualifying same-sex intimacy from any constitutional

26

Gerard V. Bradley, Remaking the Constitution: A Critical Reexamination of
the Bowers v. Hardwick Dissent, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 501, 503 (1990). Among
others, the amici included the National Gay Rights Advocates, the National
Organization for Women, the American Psychological Association, the Presbyterian
Church USA, and the attorneys general of New York and California. Id
27
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003).
28
Id. at 191.
29
Id. at 190–92.
30
See Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N. C. L. REV.
359, 362 (2001).
31
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
33
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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safeguard.34 In addition to its doctrinal argument, the Bowers majority
demonstrated an originalist conception of the Fourteenth Amendment.35
The Court offered the numerous state-level criminal prohibitions on
sodomy in existence at the time of the Amendment’s ratification as
supporting justification for refusing to bring sexual intimacy between
consenting adults of the same sex within the ambit of the Amendment’s
protection.36 For nearly two decades afterward, Bowers controlled federal
constitutional questions on statutes criminalizing sodomy, though both
state courts of last resort as well as state legislatures proceeded to revise
laws governing consensual, nonprocreative sexual behavior through the
1990s and early 2000s.37

C. Lawrence v. Texas and the Promise of Deregulating Consensual
Sexual Behavior
By 2003, fourteen U.S. states still had criminal prohibitions for
sodomy on their books.38
The Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of these remaining bans by granting certiorari to two
individuals convicted of violating a Texas statute that provides “[a] person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another individual of the same sex,”39 where deviate sexual intercourse is
defined as “any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and
the mouth or anus of another person; or the penetration of the genitals or
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. Scholars have criticized the Bowers decision’s
reading of relevant precedent for not recognizing a right to bodily integrity outside of
pregnancy as well as for positing that earlier cases foreclosed the possibility of a
constitutional right to consensual intimacy between adults. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra
note 17 at 156; Donald H. J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf off the Right to Privacy,
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 936 (2005). Likewise, it is not unlikely that antagonism
toward gay individuals, or at least gay sex, animated the majority in Bowers – which
called Hardwick’s constitutional claims “at best, facetious.” Thomas B. Stoddard,
Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 648, 655
(1987).
35
See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
36
Id. at 194–95. The Court in Bowers, however, neglected to evaluate through
its own originalist prism whether it made any difference that oral sex – the offense for
which Hardwick was arrested – was not included in any state’s statutory definition of
sodomy until 1879, over a decade after the ratification of the Civil War Amendments.
ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 17, at 24–25.
37
See Kane, supra note 24, at 315. Between Bowers and Lawrence, sodomy was
decriminalized by courts in Kentucky, Tennessee, Montana, Georgia, Maryland,
Minnesota, Arkansas, and Massachusetts, and by state legislatures in Nevada, Rhode
Island, and Arizona. Id.
38
See id. Prior to Lawrence, statutory criminal prohibitions on sodomy were
retained in Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id.
39
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2021).
34
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the anus of another person with an object.”40 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy pronounced that “Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today,”41 and that the Texas statute at issue
impermissibly burdened the petitioners’ liberty interests as “adults may
choose to enter upon this [sexual] relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons.”42
The majority also explicitly rejected the Bowers Court’s narrow
formulation of the relevant constitutional question by maintaining that
“[t]o say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward.”43 The
Lawrence holding was a watershed moment for both civil libertarians
broadly as well as the gay and lesbian advocacy community specifically,
for whom it “generated a palpable euphoria,”44 leading to speculation that
the decision might “prove to be one of the most important civil rights cases
of the twenty-first century” or even “the coup de grâce to legal moralism
administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and debilitating struggle
against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations.”45
While by directly overruling Bowers the Lawrence Court created a new
constitutional space for the protection of consensual sexual behavior,
substantial constraints remained on the operative scope of the central
holding in Lawrence that significantly limit the decision’s substantive
effect.46
The Court in Lawrence rejected both the doctrinal and historical
analysis supplied by the Bowers majority.47 In examining “whether the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the
exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,”48 the Lawrence majority found ample support in the Court’s
precedents related to both liberty and privacy for invalidating criminal
prohibitions on consensual sexual conduct between adults and held that
40

Id. §§ 21.01(1)(A)–(B) (2021).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
42
Id. at 567.
43
Id.
44
Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615,
1618 (2004).
45
Danaya C. Wright, The Logic and Experience of Law: Lawrence v. Texas and
the Politics of Privacy, 15 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 403 (2004); Bernard E.
Harcourt, Foreword: You Are Entering a Gay and Lesbian Free Zone: On the Radical
Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post–) Queers – [Raising Questions About
Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503,
503–504 (2004).
46
See infra Part II.
47
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–78.
48
Id. at 564.
41
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“[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify
its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”49
Likewise, the majority maintained that “the historical grounds relied upon
in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring
opinion by Chief Justice Burger indicate” and that “[t]heir historical
premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated.”50
Though the decision made no mention of its effect for sodomy prohibitions
in jurisdictions other than Texas, there is little reason to doubt the breadth
of its intended operation – at least within the universe of sodomy
regulations – due to the sweeping language employed by Justice Kennedy
in rejecting the state’s proffered arguments for the constitutionality of its
sodomy statute.51
49

Id. at 578. Justice Scalia took special umbrage with this formulation of the
central holding in Lawrence, which by his contention reflected that the majority
employed rational basis review, rather than one of the heightened forms of scrutiny
typically employed upon the alleged encumbrance of a fundamental right. Id. at 586
(Scalia, J., dissenting). By contrast, Laurence Tribe has defended the pragmatism and
flexibility of the majority’s approach to substantive due process in Lawrence.
Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (noting that in Lawrence “the Court
gave short shrift to the notion that it was under some obligation to confine its
implementation of substantive due process to the largely mechanical exercise of
isolating ‘fundamental rights’ as though they were a historically given set of data
points on a two–dimensional grid, with one dimension representing time and the other
representing a carefully defined and circumscribed sequence of protected primary
activities”). The doctrinal complexity of the opinion was characterized more
succinctly by Nan Hunter who offered that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas is easy to read, but difficult to pin down.” Nan D. Hunter, Living
with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2004).
50
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (majority). In rejecting the Bowers Court’s
contention that the long history of statutes criminalizing sodomy gave meaningful
constitutional cover to sodomy prohibitions in the late twentieth century, the Lawrence
majority noted that “there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed
at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter,” that “[l]aws prohibiting sodomy do not
seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private,” and that
“American laws targeting same–sex couples did not develop until the last third of the
20th century.” Id. at 568–70. The Lawrence Court, then, seemed to recognize that
many public policies whose application specifically targeted gays and lesbians were
rooted in an anti–gay animus that did not arise until after Stonewall. See William
Eskridge, Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and
Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1014–20 (2005) (detailing the extensive efforts of
the Save Our Children campaign to rescind county–level protections proscribing
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation in Dade County, Florida, and
elsewhere, as well as to prevent gay individuals from being eligible to adopt children).
51
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention
of the government”). Justice Scalia, in dissent, famously believed the downstream
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Although criminalizations of sodomy have functioned with some
regularity as mechanisms to enshrine formally the stigmatization of
homosexuality in law,52 not all prohibitions on sodomy explicitly target
nonprocreative intercourse between members of the same sex for
criminalization as did the Texas “homosexual conduct” statute challenged
in Lawrence.53 This distinction mattered in particular for Justice
O’Connor, herself a part of the original Bowers majority, as she concurred
in the outcome of Lawrence but did not subscribe to the Court’s
substantive due process analysis.54 Instead, Justice O’Connor advocated
for the retention of the core holding in Bowers – that substantive due
process did not bar criminal prohibitions on sodomy so long as such
statutes apply equally to homosexual and heterosexual intimacy. Justice
O’Connor simultaneously claimed the Texas “homosexual conduct”
statute should fail to survive rational basis review pursuant to the Equal
Protection Clause as the law “treats the same conduct differently based
solely on the participants” and “makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes
of the law by making particular conduct – and only that conduct – subject
to criminal sanction.”55 For Justice O’Connor, then, prohibitions on
sodomy and crimes against nature are not facially invalid due to their
unreasonable interference with a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
but rather, may be unconstitutional if by their discriminatory terms or
through their discriminatory application they visit sufficient inequities
upon politically vulnerable groups so as to violate the constitutional
guarantee to equal protection under the law.56 This more conservative

consequences of Lawrence would extend far beyond the invalidation of criminal
prohibitions on sex between consenting adults, inveighing that “[s]tate laws against
bigamy, same–sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’
validation of laws based on moral choices.” Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52
See William Eskridge, Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
631, 632–33 (1999).
53
See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 16–6–2(a)(1) (“A person commits the offense of
sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs
of one person and the mouth or anus of another”). Even the Texas prohibition against
sodomy did not always target gay sex as explicitly as the statute challenged in
Lawrence did. While the state’s original crime against nature statute (enacted in 1860)
was mum on precisely what sexual conduct it sought to penalize – indeed, the law was
so vague that Texas courts regularly overturned convictions pursuant to it until 1879,
when the state legislature repealed the requirement that criminal laws be “expressly
defined” in order to be enforceable – the Texas sodomy statute as revised in 1973 and
as challenged in Lawrence did not attempt even the barest sleight of hand to conceal
which part of the population it sought to target. Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of
Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464, 1469–72 (2004).
54
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
55
Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
56
See id. at 579–85 (majority opinion).
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privacy jurisprudence – rejected by the majority in Lawrence – would
dramatically limit the extent to which the Constitution protects
individuals’ right to engage in criminalization by the states.
While contemporary reactions to the Lawrence holding either
celebrated its forceful defense of individual liberty or lamented it for
promoting tolerance of homosexuality, the decision itself went to some
lengths in clarifying what exactly the case did not concern.57 Most likely
to inoculate itself against the parade of horribles cited by Justice Scalia’s
dissent as potential ramifications of the Lawrence rule going forward,58
the decision stipulated in relevant part:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full
and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices
common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to
respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence
or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.59

In this paragraph clarifying the scope of the Lawrence rule, the
majority enumerated a series of circumstances involving sexual conduct
that by implication remain constitutionally regulable despite the central
holding in the instant case.60 Namely, the exceptions paragraph suggests
that the substantive due process doctrine as articulated in Lawrence was
not intended to mandate the invalidation of criminal prohibitions on sex
between adults and minors, forcible sex, commercial sex, or public sex,
and instead makes evident that the engine driving the majority’s critical
evaluation of the Texas homosexual conduct law was the burden imposed
by the statute on private, consensual sexual intimacy between adults.61 In
fact, as of the date of this publication, no concerted legal effort has been
made to employ Lawrence as a mechanism for invalidating any of the
criminal prohibitions enumerated above. What the Court neglected to
57

Id. at 578.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
59
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
60
Id.
61
Id. The exceptions paragraph also maintains that Lawrence should not be read
as an endorsement of the notion that there exists any federal constitutional protection
for same–sex marriage, but this did not stop Justice Kennedy from citing Lawrence as
a supporting authority in decisions invalidating both federal and state same–sex
marriage bans in the 2010s. Id.; see, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 667
(2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013).
58
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consider, however, and the object of inquiry in Part II below, is the
possibility that the core holding in Lawrence – by my reading, that statutes
criminalizing private sexual intimacy between consenting adults should be
unenforceable against any conduct – might be construed so narrowly that
it would permit states to continue imposing deprivations of individuals’
liberty and property, both directly and indirectly, as a result of criminal
statutes facially proscribing sodomy.62 In other words, despite all its
promise for the deregulation of consensual sexual conduct, the impact of
the Lawrence decision is constrained by a nontrivial omission: the absence
of precise and thorough guidelines for ensuring compliance with the
constitutional demands both specified in and implied by the holding.63

III. LIFE AFTER LAWRENCE: THE MIRAGE OF AUTOMATIC
INVALIDATION
The Lawrence decision is important not only for what it contains, but
also for what it does not.64 As I detailed in Part I, the majority in Lawrence
took conscious steps using the exceptions paragraph to reassure its
skeptics that a diverse swath of prohibitions on sexual conduct would
remain constitutionally viable even after the decision explicitly overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick,65 and held that the Texas homosexual conduct statute
– not merely its application – infringed on the substantive rights
guaranteed by due process.66 The decision does not, however, denote with
any precision how states should proceed to revise their criminal or
administrative codes to ensure consistency with the majority’s reading of
substantive due process in the wake of the Lawrence ruling.67 This Part
argues that the absence of precise and thorough remedial guidelines to
direct policy implementation in the Lawrence holding – though by no
means a unique feature of that decision – confers excessive discretion on
state judicial and prosecutorial officials to interpret selectively and
narrowly their constitutional obligations under Lawrence and, in so doing,
62

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 578; see discussion infra Part II. Mary Anne Case
was nearly alone among prominent scholars in that she almost immediately recognized
that the promise of the Lawrence holding might prove illusory or incomplete, though
the concerns she raises – largely related to linguistic ambiguity in the decision – are
separate from those I discuss in this Article. Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That”
in Lawrence v. Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 83 (“Although I hope I am wrong, I can
imagine that, in the same way as Bowers turned out … in the end not to be as bad as
was feared for the progress of gay rights, Lawrence may turn out not to be as good as
many now hope”).
63
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
64
See id.
65
478 U.S. 186 (1986); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers…ought not to
remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled”).
66
Id.
67
See id.
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enables the continued (if limited) persistence of exactly the sort of legal
regime that the Lawrence Court ostensibly intended to eradicate.68 In Part
II-A, I provide an overview of the complications inherent in judicially
directed alterations to public policy in a polity where governance is
characterized by the radical fragmentation of authority; then, in Parts II-B
through II-E, I analyze the manner in which legislative, judicial, and
prosecutorial decisions made subsequent to Lawrence have allowed
statutes criminally regulating sodomy to endure.69

A. Implementing Judicial Decisions in a Decentralized Polity
Thanks largely to the power of judicial review, courts play a more
central role in the policy process in the United States than in many other
advanced industrial democracies.70 In a formal sense, judicial review
permits United States courts to strike down actions by legislative,
executive, and even other judicial officials if such actions are inconsistent
with the U.S. Constitution. 71 Beyond this well-established
conceptualization of judicial review as a negative power – i.e., the capacity
to invalidate legislative and administrative policies they gauge as
unconstitutional – scholars also understand the combination of judicial
review alongside certain other features of the American constitutional

68

See id.
See id.
70
See generally GORDAN SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES,
CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS 1–3 (2009) (maintaining that “[l]aw and
politics cannot be disentangled in the United States” and that this relationship “has
something to do with American political culture itself”); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC
STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION (2002) (noting in their study of
the judicialization of politics that while other countries in the post–World War II era
have adopted some form of judicial review, the practice is most common and most
closely associated with the United States); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: AN ESSAY
ON LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICS 12 (1964) (suggesting that “[i]f many lawyers, in
America especially, do recognize that the courts do legislate and make basic social
choices, this is less true and even less accepted in other countries” and that in the
United States “both the nature of the issues placed before the courts and the greater
scope of choice available put the judiciary inevitably into the very midst of the great
political battles of the nation”); Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court in American
Politics, ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 161 (2003) (detailing the extent of judicial interventions
in American public policy throughout the second half of the twentieth century);
Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 50 (1976) (arguing that the Supreme Court provides more than simply a
rubber stamp for the policy preferences of the elected branches).
71
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 344 (1816) (holding that the
United States Supreme Court could overrule state courts of last resort as regards
disputes over federal law); Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (involving one of
the first prominent instances of negative judicial review by the United States Supreme
Court vis–à–vis a federal statute).
69
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order as positively encouraging judicial participation in the policy
process.72 More particularly, as political polarization in Congress
increases, and when nonuniform partisan control across the Presidency
and the chambers of Congress abets legislative gridlock, courts
increasingly fill the vacuum resulting from inaction in the elected branches
by providing answers to policy questions considered either too
controversial or politically sensitive by officials concerned with
reelection.73 Even when federal elected institutions are not gridlocked,
courts participate actively in determining the distribution of rights, duties,
and obligations in the American polity. Specifically, judicial decisions fill
interstitial gaps in the terms of legislation, regulation, or existing judicial
precedent by providing a definitive legal interpretation of ambiguous or
imprecise language whose meaning is the subject of litigation.74
Despite the enormous authority enjoyed by American courts
exercising judicial review, the enforcement of judicial decisions, by and
large, occurs through a constitutional leap of faith.75 In other words, even
if the Supreme Court holds that a given state law or practice is
unconstitutional on its face, there exists no guarantee that the state in
question – let alone states where equivalent or substantially comparable
statutes, rules, or practices are also in place76 – will immediately cease
72

See, e.g., Jeb Barnes, Adversarial Legalism, the Rise of Judicial Policymaking,
and the Separation–of–Powers Doctrine, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN
INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE 35, 35–36 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004)
(arguing that the fragmentation of authority across American institutions has “placed
courts at the center of important political and policy disputes almost since [the
country’s] founding” and detailing how an excessively formalistic conception of the
separation of powers encourages the underestimation of American judicial power).
73
See Jeb Barnes, Bringing the Courts Back In: Interbranch Perspectives on the
Role of Courts in American Politics and Policy Making, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 25,
27–28 (2007) (contending that the structure of the U.S. government incentivizes
“games of political ‘hot potato,’ in which each branch tries to fob off controversial
issues on another”).
74
See, e.g., THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES (2014)
(detailing the increase in the employment of litigation as a means attempting to resolve
divisive political issues); James J. Brudney, The Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor:
Justice Ginsburg’s Eclectic Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
889, 911–12 (2009) (describing courts as participating in an ongoing dialogue with
other public institutions through their corrections of legislative policy).
75
See, e.g., Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1713, 1729 (2017) (maintaining that judicial determinations of
public policy only create obligations as judgments for the parties, through the law of
remedies, and as precedent for other courts, but – unlike proponents of judicial
supremacy – that judicial decisions do not bind legislative or executive ventures into
constitutional interpretation).
76
The expectation that states should cease enforcing a statute if it is comparable
to one from another state declared constitutionally deficient by the Supreme Court has
been called judicial universality by Josh Blackman. Blackman, supra note 5, at 1155–
59.
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enforcing the law or engaging in the practice.77 For this reason, while a
judicial decision (from the Supreme Court or otherwise) bringing a policy
into constitutional disrepute is a necessary first step in preventing
continued implementation, the announcement of the holding alone is not a
sufficient condition for ensuring enforcement of the policy ceases. I refer
to this common expectation – the assumption that the immediate
consequence of negative judicial review is the abandonment of the practice
deemed unconstitutional – as the mirage of automatic invalidation.
While United States courts may be uniquely well-suited to contribute
to the process of formulating public policy, they lack the requisite
institutional characteristics to participate as meaningfully in policy
implementation.78 In particular, it is a challenge for United States courts
to guarantee compliance with their holdings due to (1) the fundamental
passivity of American judicial institutions,79 and (2) the decentralization
of political authority in the American federal system.80 Institutional
passivity complicates the implementation of judicially constructed public
policy because United States courts are constitutionally barred from
issuing decisions or directives in the absence of an active case or
controversy; powerless to root out instances of noncompliance
independently, they must instead wait for litigants to discover or
experience defiance of judicial rulings and bring suit themselves as a

77
See, e.g., Mark Golub, Remembering Massive Resistance to School
Desegregation, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 491 (2013) (chronicling the difficulty of
implementing the Brown v. Board of Education holding throughout the southern
United States, where recalcitrant officials engaged in a program of so–called massive
resistance to school integration).
78
See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 15–21 (1991) (arguing that institutional and organizational features
of American courts lead to special challenges for the enforcement of judicial policy
revisions).
79
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (delineating the constitutional case or controversy
requirement, which limits U.S. judicial power to those instances in which there exists
a live dispute, and thus prohibits courts from issuing advisory opinions or unsolicited
remedial holdings as to do so would constitute deciding disputes in which litigants
have not brought a case).
80
See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 298–300 (1989) (contrasting the
concentration of political authority in parliamentary systems with the policy process
in the United States which he compares to a “barroom brawl” where “[a]nybody can
join in, the combatants fight all comers and sometimes change sides, no referee is in
charge, and the fight lasts not for a fixed number of rounds but indefinitely or until
everybody drops from exhaustion”). In addition to the multiplicity of institutions in
the national government responsible for the development of public policy – the
product of the horizontal fragmentation of authority across legislative, executive, and
judicial branches as well as the abundance of policy–relevant agencies, offices, and
bureaus in the administrative state – American political power is also vertically
divided between the national government and the fifty state governments which retain
powers not delegated to federal institutions. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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corrective action.81 Assuming that an adequate remedy for noncompliance
exists – itself not always a certainty – judicial passivity nevertheless shifts
the burden for monitoring and reporting the compliance status with a given
ruling to stakeholder groups and individuals in the polity. If such
interested parties encounter public institutions ignoring (whether willfully
or negligently) a judicial decision but are unaware of their legal rights to
initiate litigation challenging noncompliance – or are unable or unwilling
to contest non-implementation themselves – American courts lack the
authority to launch the pursuit of legal recourse independently.
The challenges presented by judicial passivity for the enforcement of
court decisions are magnified by the decentralization of political authority
in the United States. As the Constitution divides power vertically between
national and state governments, and horizontally through the separation of
powers into legislative, executive, and judicial functions at both the
national and state levels, the responsibility for formulating and
implementing public policy in the United States is fragmented across
hundreds of thousands of individuals.82 The separation of powers presents
a challenge to the consistent enforcement of judicial rulings as American
courts lack directly accountable agents responsible for affirmatively
overseeing the implementation phase of a court decision.83 Rather, courts
rely on cooperation by officials serving in the myriad other public
institutions whose compliance is required for judicial decisions to be

81

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
This crude estimate of hundreds of thousands is based on the following: in
addition to the 535 members of the U.S. Congress, there are hundreds of judges
serving in the federal judiciary and, according to the Congressional Research Service,
over 2 million members of the federal executive branch civilian workforce even
excluding the postal service. JULIE JENNINGS & JARED C. NAGEL, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43590, FEDERAL WORKFORCE STATISTICS SOURCES: OPM AND OMB (2020).
Though presumably not all 2 million federal civil servants have expansive policy
discretion, many do; when added to the population of state legislators – according to
the NCSL, there are 7383 across the United States – as well as state judges and
bureaucrats as well as local (city and county) public officials, it would seem the crude
estimate offered here may in actuality be a conservative one. See Number of
Legislators and Length of Terms in Years, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about–state–legislatures/number–of–legislators–and–
length–of–terms.aspx [https://perma.cc/8HJ2-FSJE] (last visited Jan. 25, 2021).
83
See Clifford J. Carrubba and Christopher Zorn, Executive Discretion, Judicial
Decision Making, and Separation of Powers in the United States, 72 J. POL. 812, 822–
23 (2010) (finding that the executive branch’s willingness to comply with U.S.
Supreme Court holdings is inconsistent and incomplete, as “[h]igh court influence
critically depends upon indirect enforcement of its decisions by the public”); but see
David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 732
(2009) (arguing that “[t]he ability of courts to mobilize the public against the
government means that government disobedience of courts carries potentially severe
consequences.”).
82
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effectively implemented.84 This includes, so far as substantive criminal
law is concerned, the expectation that law enforcement will cease arresting
individuals for allegedly having committed offenses if the relevant
statutory criminal prohibition – or one substantially comparable to it from
another state – has been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Likewise, if for some reason an individual experiences a deprivation of
their rights or liberties as a result of allegedly having violated a
presumptively unconstitutional law, inferior courts (whether federal or
state) reviewing the arrest or conviction are generally expected to follow
established Supreme Court precedent and refuse to permit the enforcement
of the invalidated prohibition.85
The lesson passed down from history and reinforced by
contemporary experience (including the subject matter of this Article), is
that common expectations about the enforcement of judicial decisions –
corollaries to the mirage of automatic invalidation – may easily be
frustrated by entrenched noncooperation, or even active defiance, among
recalcitrant officials including but not limited to judges, legislators, police,
and prosecutors.86 Further, the decentralization of political authority
presents an even more vexing difficulty given the passivity of the
American judiciary: if, for instance, multiple states refuse to cease
enforcement of laws presumed unconstitutional based on a decision by the
Supreme Court, preventing continued noncompliance with the holding
may require initiating separate litigation in each noncooperative
jurisdiction. This inefficiency – among the pathologies inherent in a
federal system – substantially raises the costs associated with eradicating
localized resistance to judicially directed policy revisions.
Taken together, the passivity of judicial institutions and the
decentralization of political authority in the United States generate serious
complications for ensuring that the legal, social, and economic effects of
court rulings are not circumscribed as a result of either deliberate or
ROSENBERG, supra note 78, at 15 (maintaining that “for Court orders to be
carried out, political elites, electorally accountable, must support them and act to
implement them”).
85
See id. at 18 (noting that appellate courts rely on the willingness of trial courts
to implement their holdings as “[o]nly rarely do appellate courts issue final orders,”
leaving “lower–court judges with a great deal of discretion”).
86
Thoroughgoing, organized noncompliance with Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) throughout the American South is probably the most
prominent example of this phenomenon. See id. at 39–106 (making the case that
widespread integration of public facilities and expansion of voting rights occurred
primarily as a function of legislative and executive, rather than judicial, action). More
recently, some local officials attempted to avoid compliance with the Supreme Court’s
decision to invalidate state–level same–sex marriage bans in Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. 644 (2015), though nothing even approaching the campaign of massive
resistance in the South after Brown. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483; Tiffany C. Graham,
Obergefell and Resistance, 84 UMKC L. REV. 715, 725–31 (2016).
84
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negligent noncompliance with judicial decisions. To overcome these
institutional obstacles foists considerable demands on both litigants and
advocates to ferret out acts of noncompliance across many geographic
subunits and then navigate legal challenges in multiple fora across the
polycentric system of American government. The remaining subsections
of Part II analyze the manner in which public officials have approached
the criminalization of sodomy after Lawrence v. Texas, and present
evidence suggesting that due to precisely the sort of institutional
constraints on the judiciary discussed here, criminal prohibitions on
sodomy – rather than being the object of automatic invalidation – have
survived their intended death.87

B. Formal Changes to State Sodomy Prohibitions after Lawrence
By the time Lawrence was decided, the majority of U.S. states had
decriminalized consensual sodomy but statutory prohibitions on
consensual sodomy or crimes against nature remained enforceable in

539 U.S. 558 (2003). My argument is consistent with Howard Wasserman’s
contention that constitutional adjudication rests on the principle (among others) that
“[c]onstitutionally defective laws do not disappear or cease to be law following a
judicial ruling,” that a “Court’s declaration of constitutional invalidity...does not mean
the law ceases to take effect or ceases to [] exist once it has taken effect.” Howard
Wasserman, Precedent, Non–Universal Injunctions, and Judicial Departmentalism:
A Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1077, 1080
(2020).
87
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fourteen states:88 Alabama,89 Florida,90 Idaho,91 Kansas,92 Louisiana,93
Michigan,94 Mississippi,95 Missouri,96 North Carolina,97 Oklahoma,98

88

These remaining statutory prohibitions on sodomy are comparable in many
regards to the state statutes enacted to organize racial segregation that were not
repealed for decades after Brown. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); see Still on the Books: Jim Crow and Segregation Laws Fifty Years after
Brown v. Board of Education, a Report on Laws Remaining in the Codes of Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REV. 460 (2006) [hereinafter Still on the Books]. By contrast, however,
while laws segregating public facilities were not widely enforced once massive
resistance came to an end, the tendency for jurisdictions to continue enforcing criminal
prohibitions on sodomy I examine in Parts II–C and II–D may not yet be in its decline.
Still on the Books; see also discussion infra Part II–C and II–D.
89
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63 to -64 (2013). In 2019, the Alabama state legislature
amended the state’s regulations on sexual conduct by striking the term “deviate sexual
intercourse” from the code, formerly defined as “[a]ny act of sexual gratification
between persons not married to each other involving the sex organs of one person and
the mouth or anus of another,” but then instead created a new statutory definition of
“sodomy,” defined as “[a]ny sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another person.” S.B. 320, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Al. 2019). Under the
revised statutes, sodomy remains a criminal offense in the event that the act is forcible,
one party lacks the physical or mental capacity to give consent, or there is a
sufficiently large age gap between the parties. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63 to -64 (2019).
The provision from the pre–revision code which had defined deviate sexual
intercourse as only occurring between unmarried persons had been found by a state
appellate court to violate equal protection in 1986 but had not yet been revised prior
to the 2019 legislative session. Joseph A. Colquitt, The Alabama Criminal Code – 25
Years and Counting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 967, 988–89 (2005).
90
FLA. STAT. § 800.2 (2021). Florida’s original crimes against nature statute was
struck down by the state supreme court for unconstitutional vagueness in 1971, but
the same court held concurrently that anal and oral sex could still be prosecuted
pursuant to the state’s unnatural and lascivious conduct statute. Franklin v. State, 257
So.2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971).
91
IDAHO CODE § 18–6605 (2021).
92
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21–5504 (2011), invalidated by State v. Franco, 319 P.3d
551 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).
93
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (2018), invalidated by La. Electorate of Gays and
Lesbians, Inc. v. Connick, 902 So.2d 1090 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
94
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.158 (2021). In addition to sodomy, the Michigan
code penalizes acts of “gross indecency.” Id.
95
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97–29–59 (2021); but cf. Doe v. Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d
749, 762 (D. Miss. 2018) (calling into doubt constitutional validity of Mississippi
sodomy statute).
96
MO. REV. STAT. § 566.060 (2005).
97
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–177 (2021), invalidated by State v. Whiteley, 616
S.E.2d 576 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
98
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (2021).
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South Carolina,99 Texas,100 Utah,101 and Virginia.102 In other states,
statutes criminally sanctioning sodomy or crimes against nature remained
on the books but had been invalidated by state courts prior to Lawrence.103
While the decision in Lawrence appears rather clearly to render any
continuing efforts to criminalize private, consensual sexual conduct
impermissible, few of the states whose sodomy prohibitions were still
operable in early 2003 took affirmative steps to formally repeal their
statutes criminalizing sodomy after the decision was handed down.
However, state legislatures in Alabama, Missouri, Utah, and Virginia
revised their state codes in the years following Lawrence to approach
consistency with the Court’s endorsement of constitutional protections for
private, consensual sexual behavior.104 In Alabama, the legislature revised
the state’s criminal code in 2019 by excising the prohibition on deviate
sexual intercourse and replacing it with criminal prohibitions on sodomy
involving the use of force, sex with minors, or where one party lacks
capacity to consent.105 This followed an earlier action by the Missouri
state legislature, which amended its sodomy statute to criminalize only
nonconsensual or forcible sodomy.106 The state legislatures of Virginia
and Utah followed a similar trajectory, altering their states’ criminal codes
99

S.C. ANN. § 16–15–120 (2021).
TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 21.06(a) (2021), invalidated by City of Dallas v.
England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
101
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76–5–403 (2019).
102
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–361 (2014), invalidated by MacDonald v. Moose, 710
F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013).
103
See, e.g., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (holding that the
Georgia sodomy statute upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers was a violation
of the right to privacy as protected in the Georgia Constitution); Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defs. v. Attorney Gen., 763 N.E.2d 38, 40 (Mass. 2002) (holding that
private, consensual sexual conduct cannot be constitutionally criminalized in
Massachusetts).
104
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see infra notes 106–107 and
accompanying text.
105
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
106
Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 566.060 (2019) (stipulating that a person
commits sodomy “if he or she has deviate sexual intercourse with another person who
is incapacitated, incapable of consent, or lacks the capacity to consent, or by the use
of forcible compulsion”), with id. § 566.090(1) (2005) (criminalizing sexual
misconduct, which is defined as engaging in “deviate sexual intercourse with another
person of the same sex”). Unlike the Alabama definition, the Missouri statutes’
definition of deviate sexual intercourse, still in effect today, does not limit deviate
sexual intercourse to sex between unmarried persons. MO. REV. STAT. § 566.010(3)
(2021). Prior to both the Missouri statute’s modification as well as Lawrence, the
Missouri sexual misconduct law was invalidated for counties in the northwestern part
of the state by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, which held that
defendants could only be convicted of sexual misconduct if the state could prove that
the defendant’s sexual partner did not consent to the act. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558;
State v. Cogshell, 997 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
100
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to ensure as a legislative matter that private, consensual sodomy was no
longer formally a criminal offense in 2014 and 2019, respectively.107 In
addition to these four states, legislators in Maryland and Montana enacted
bills to repeal prohibitions on sodomy that remained in their states’ codes
despite pre-Lawrence litigation in each state’s courts having invalidated
the sodomy bans.108
Prior to the Virginia General Assembly’s decision to decriminalize
sodomy in 2014, the commonwealth’s crimes against nature statute was
already of doubtful constitutionality due to Lawrence.109 In MacDonald
v. Moose, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Lawrence to hold that the
provision of the Virginia crimes against nature statute criminalizing
sodomy was facially unconstitutional.110 In 2005, William Scott
MacDonald was convicted of criminal solicitation based on a state court’s
finding that he had solicited oral sex from a young woman. 111 The Virginia
statute on criminal solicitation imposes felony sanctions on “[a]ny person
who commands, entreats, or otherwise attempts to persuade another
person to commit a felony other than murder.”112 Therefore, some
predicate felonious offense whose commission was solicited by the
accused is a necessary condition for a criminal solicitation conviction.113
In MacDonald’s case, the predicate for the solicitation charge was the offer

107
See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–361 (2014) (defining crimes against nature as
bestiality and incest); see also S.B. 14, 2014 Sess. (Va. 2014) (removing sodomy from
the statutory list of crimes against nature in § 18.2–361); Compare UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76–5–403(1)–(3) (2017) (making it a class B misdemeanor if someone “engages in
any sexual act with a person who is 14 years of age or older involving the genitals of
one person and mouth or anus of another person”) with id. § 76–5–403 (2019)
(criminalizing only forcible sodomy).
108
H.B. 81, 441st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020) ((repealing the criminal
prohibitions on sodomy from §§ 3–321 and 3–322 of the state’s criminal code as well
as striking sodomy from the list of statutory examples of “sexual molestation or
exploitation” in the definitions statute governing procedures in the state’s juvenile
proceedings at § 3–801(aa)(5)); compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–2–101(20) (1997)
(defining deviate sexual relations as “sexual contact or sexual intercourse between two
persons of the same sex or any form of sexual intercourse with an animal”) with id. §
45–2–101(21) (2019) (defining deviate sexual relations only as sexual intercourse
with an animal)l; Williams v. Glendening, No. 98036031/CL–1059, 1998 WL
965992, at *7 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998) (clarifying that the Maryland sodomy ban
should not apply to private, consensual sex); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 123
(Mont. 1997) (holding that Montana’s deviate sexual conduct statute violates the right
to privacy protected by Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution).
109
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
110
710 F.3d 154, 166 (4th Cir. 2013); see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
111
MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 157–158 (4th Cir. 2013).
112
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–29 (2021).
113
See id.
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to commit what remained on the Virginia books as sodomy.114 At trial,
MacDonald unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the criminal solicitation
charge “on the ground that the predicate felony – the anti-sodomy
provision – violated his due process rights.”115 After his conviction,
MacDonald initiated federal proceedings, where the Eastern Virginia
District Court rejected his claim that the sodomy prohibition was
unconstitutional as applied “because the Commonwealth had properly
treated seventeen-year-olds as children, and because the Lawrence
decision had stressed that ‘[t]he present case does not involve minors,’ the
anti-sodomy provision could constitutionally serve as a predicate offense
under the solicitation statute.”116 The District Court thus attempted to
locate a constitutional stopgap for the Virginia crimes against nature
statute (which banned all sodomy, regardless the age or consent status of
the participants) in Lawrence’s exceptions paragraph by reading that case
as forbidding the criminalization of private, nonprocreative sex between
consenting adults, but not proscribing the enforcement of sodomy bans so
long as the conduct underlying the charge qualifies under one of
Lawrence’s exceptions.117
MacDonald appealed from the Eastern District of Virginia to the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, where a three-judge panel endorsed his
theory of Lawrence’s scope.118 The Fourth Circuit panel recognized a
broad conception of the constitutional safeguards protecting private,
consensual sexual intimacy, maintaining that “[i]n Lawrence, the Supreme
Court plainly held that statutes criminalizing private acts of consensual
sodomy between adults are inconsistent with the protections of liberty
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”119 The
Court elaborated further that because the Lawrence majority
unambiguously overruled Bowers, and because the Virginia crimes against
nature statute was “materially indistinguishable from” the Georgia statute
at issue in Bowers, faithful adherence to Lawrence compels the conclusion
“that the anti-sodomy provision, prohibiting sodomy between two persons
without any qualification, is facially unconstitutional.”120
114

MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 157–158; see id.
MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 157.
116
Id. at 159 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
117
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see supra notes 60–63 and
accompanying text.
118
MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 159, 167. Namely, MacDonald asserted that “the
Virginia courts have impermissibly interpreted Lawrence as authorizing them to recast
the anti–sodomy provision – which by its terms bans all sodomy offenses – and apply
the provision solely to sodomy offenses that involve minors.” Id. at 160.
119
Id. at 163 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
120
Id. at 163–67. The MacDonald majority did not dispute the abstract
possibility that some criminal regulations of sodomy are in all likelihood
constitutionally permissible pursuant to Lawrence’s exceptions paragraph so long as
the prohibitions are drafted in more specific terms than the Virginia crimes against
115
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The Fourth Circuit, thus, adamantly rejected the constitutional
integrity of a state statute that criminalizes sodomy if the law is drafted
without any qualifying or explicatory criteria that make clear the statute’s
prohibitions do not apply to private, consensual sex between adults.121
Perhaps of equal significance, the Court’s holding suggests that a statute
criminalizing the type of behavior deemed constitutionally protected by
Lawrence is invalid not only in the context of direct enforcement (as in
Lawrence), but also if employed indirectly as a statutory felony predicate
to a criminal solicitation charge.122 As discussed at greater length in Parts
II-C and II-D below, there are common, ongoing practices in a number of
states that employ both pre- and post-Lawrence sodomy convictions to
justify the imposition of legal, administrative, and financial burdens on
individuals in a manner that contravenes the notion articulated in
MacDonald that neither direct nor collateral enforcement of statutes
criminalizing consensual sodomy is constitutionally sound.123
Contrary, then, to conventional wisdom in both the legal academy
and popular imagination, to assert that Lawrence invalidated all sodomy
laws is an oversimplification, and few states took steps formally to repeal
criminal prohibitions on sodomy in their jurisdiction after 2003.124 Rather,
Lawrence cast explicit constitutional disapproval on the criminalization of
private sexual intimacy between consenting adults, but through the
exceptions paragraph let multiple avenues remain which state regulations
on sexual behavior might nevertheless survive.125 To be clear, I take no
steps here to dispute that there may exist compelling policy rationales for
criminalizing some of the conduct left constitutionally eligible for sanction
by the exceptions paragraph (e.g., sex with young children, sexual
intercourse in which a party does not or cannot consent). I argue, however,

nature had been. Id. at 165–66. The Fourth Circuit maintained, however, that
amending the state’s sodomy law to pass constitutional muster was a legislative, rather
than a judicial, task, as “[t]he [Supreme] Court’s ruminations [in Lawrence]
concerning the circumstances under which a state might permissibly outlaw sodomy,
however, no doubt contemplated deliberate action by the people’s representatives,
rather than by the judiciary.” Id. at. 165.
121
See id. at 166–67. Some critics disagree with the Fourth Circuit’s treatment
of the Virginia crimes against nature statute, alleging that rather than “treating [the
crimes against nature statute] as partially facially unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit
should have treated it as the Virginia courts did: unenforceable in those circumstances
in which its enforcement would infringe on the personal liberty interests recognized
in Lawrence, but otherwise enforceable.” Kevin C. Walsh, Observations on
MacDonald v. Moose, 65 S. C. L. REV. 951, 960 (2014).
122
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
123
See infra Part II–D.
124
See generally MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45–33–23(h)(xi), 97–29–59; GA. CODE.
ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23–3–430(C)(11); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14–177; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–6605; LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(2) (2006).
125
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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that to permit the continued imposition of criminal liability – whether
directly or indirectly – pursuant to state laws that on their face penalize
private sexual intimacy between consenting adults perverts the core rule
in Lawrence even if, as in MacDonald, the specific conduct the state
sought to punish in a given case would itself have been illegal had the
prohibitory statute been more carefully drafted. As I demonstrate below,
the criminal regulation of sodomy has endured after Lawrence through
precisely the kinds of maneuvers rejected in MacDonald, and in the
subsections that follow, I catalog the direct and indirect means by which
criminal prohibitions on sodomy have survived their own purported death.

C. Direct Enforcement of Sodomy Laws After Lawrence
Developments in the criminal regulation of sodomy over the past two
decades suggest that Lawrence slowed down the imposition of criminal
sanctions pursuant to statutes that on their face prohibit private,
consensual, nonprocreative intercourse, but it did not stop the enforcement
of such laws altogether. Through the combination of legislative refusal to
repeal statutes criminalizing private, consensual sodomy and judicial
reluctance to read Lawrence’s constitutional directive with the appropriate
breadth, several states – as well as the United States military126 – have
shown little interest in ceasing to enforce laws that seem to violate the core
rule from Lawrence.127 The following is intended to constitute neither an
argument for decriminalizing the sexual practices prosecuted in the
subsequent discussion, nor a normative justification of the conduct; rather,
I contend that should public officials wish to impose criminal prohibitions
on the forms of sexual behavior suggested by Lawrence’s list of
exceptions, they should follow the letter and spirit of Lawrence by doing
so pursuant to statutes tailored to criminalize that – and only that –
conduct.
The ongoing employment of statutes facially criminalizing private,
consensual, nonprocreative sexual intercourse to regulate sexual behavior
in Louisiana, Idaho, and North Carolina is illustrative of the tendency in
some states to continue treating sodomy bans as remaining enforceable in

126

See United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 203 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (holding that
Lawrence did not facially invalidate the ban on sodomy in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, and creating a three–part as–applied analysis for military courts to
discern whether enforcement of the UCMJ sodomy prohibition in a given case does
or does not violate Lawrence).
127
See, e.g., State v. Gomez–Alas, 477 P.3d 911, 918 (Idaho 2020) (interpreting
Lawrence as only creating “a constitutional prohibition against criminalizing the
private sexual conduct of two consenting adults” but not against a statute that does so
on its face).
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at least some circumstances after Lawrence.128 In 2003, Tina Thomas
appeared before a Louisiana trial court charged with soliciting an
undercover police officer to engage in “unnatural carnal copulation for
compensation” in violation of the Louisiana crime against nature statute.129
The trial court granted Thomas’s motion to quash by reading Lawrence as
rendering the Louisiana crime against nature statute constitutionally
inoperable.130 Interpreting Lawrence as standing for the proposition that
“all persons” deserve freedom from government interference “in deciding
their sexual activities and preferences providing the relationship involves
consenting adults,” the Court held that the statute violated the substantive
due process guarantee to liberty.131 Further, the trial court noted that had
Thomas offered the undercover agent vaginal – rather than oral –
intercourse, she would instead have been charged with prostitution (a
misdemeanor in Louisiana) rather than a crime against nature (a felony).132
Thus, the trial court emphasized the inequity inherent in statutes that
establish as official state policy an enhanced punitive regime governing
the primary sexual behavior practiced by those desiring same-sex intimacy
as compared with vaginal intercourse.133 On appeal, however, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana called the trial court’s “reliance on
Lawrence…misplaced,” and interpreted Lawrence as analytically
irrelevant due to its reference to commercial sex in the exceptions
paragraph.134 Further, the Court held that the provision of the crime against
nature statute pursuant to which Thomas was charged (which criminalized
solicitation of unnatural carnal copulation) was severable from the portion
of the statute facially criminalizing consensual sexual conduct and thus
remained enforceable.135
128
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(2) (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–6605; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14–177.
129
State v. Thomas, 891 So.2d 1233, 1234 (La. 2005); LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:89(A)(2) (2006).
130
Thomas, 891 So.2d at 1234–35.
131
Id. at 1234.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
At the time Thomas was decided, Louisiana regulated consensual sodomy via
two subsections of the crime against nature statute. Compare LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:89(A)(1) (2006) (criminalizing “[t]he unnatural carnal copulation by a human
being with another of the same sex or opposite sex”) with LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:89(A)(2) (2006) (criminalizing “[t]he solicitation by a human being of another with
the intent to engage in any unnatural carnal copulation for compensation”). After
multiple revisions to the code subsequent to Lawrence, Louisiana still criminalizes
consensual crimes against nature as well as the solicitation of crimes against nature
separately using substantially comparable language, but now codified in different
sections of the code, possibly due to consistent biennial reports by the Louisiana State
Law Institute Constitutional Laws Committee to the state legislature suggesting the
consensual sodomy ban is unconstitutional. Unconstitutional Statutes Biennial Report
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Although in Thomas the Louisiana Supreme Court avoided passing
direct judgment on the facial constitutionality of the state’s prohibition on
consensual crimes against nature by focusing on the subsection of the
Louisiana code criminalizing solicitation, the Court’s language betrays its
likely estimation of the consensual sodomy ban’s constitutional merit.136
Namely, the Court read Lawrence as leaving “unaffected charges
involving public conduct or prostitution.”137 The Lawrence Court,
however, demonstrated its judgment that an entire statute was
unenforceable, rather than simply invalidating a charge entered pursuant
to that statute.138 More importantly, the Louisiana law criminalizing
consensual crimes against nature is the functional equivalent of the
Georgia statute upheld as constitutional in Bowers, which Lawrence
unambiguously overturned.139 By interpreting Lawrence as governing
charging decisions pursuant to statutes that facially criminalize consensual
sodomy – rather than the constitutionality of such statutory regulations
altogether – the Supreme Court of Louisiana demonstrates its
understanding of Lawrence as an as-applied judgment proscribing the
criminal prosecution of private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse,
but not the enactment of statutes that can only be interpreted to exempt
private, consensual sex from criminal sanction through the most laborious
mental gymnastics.140
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also read Lawrence as forbidding
prosecutors from charging defendants with crimes against nature for
engaging in private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse, but as
otherwise not affecting the Idaho sodomy ban, which imposes a minimum
five-year prison sentence for “[e]very person who is guilty of the infamous
crime against nature.”141 In State v. Cook, the Idaho appellate court
reviewed a claim by Jack Cook, who had been charged with the felony

to the Legislature, LA. STATE L. INST. CONST. L. COMM. 36 (Mar. 13, 2018)
https://lsli.org/files/reports/2018/2018%20Unconstitutional%20Statutes%20Biennial
%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7GS-ASR8].
136
See Thomas, 891 So.2d at 1235–38.
137
Id. at 1238 (emphasis added).
138
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life
of the individual”).
139
See GA. CODE. ANN. § 16–6–2(a)(1); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(1) (2006).
Unlike the Texas statute at issue in Lawrence, the Georgia and Louisiana sodomy bans
criminalize nonprocreative sexual intercourse between both same–sex and opposite–
sex couples. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 16–6–2(a)(1); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(1)
(2006).
140
See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14.89(A)(1) (2019) (criminalizing unnatural
carnal copulation regardless of consent, venue, the existence of a transactional
relationship between the parties, or their ages).
141
State v. Cook, 192 P.3d 1086 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18–6605.
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crime against nature for performing fellatio on an individual with Down’s
Syndrome in a gym sauna.142 Cook pleaded guilty to having oral sex with
another individual, but the information charging Cook stipulated neither
that the act took place in public nor that the other individual could not
consent.143 As such, Cook appealed on the grounds that per the terms of
the information he could have faced a conviction based on private,
consensual sex as well.144 The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected Cook’s
claim as he had “not shown that he was prosecuted for conduct that
occurred in private and with an adult who could and did consent,” and held
that Cook not “admit[ting] some details of the underlying allegations when
he pled guilty is not relevant.”145 Like the Louisiana Supreme Court in
State v. Thomas, then, the Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted Lawrence as
demanding only an as-applied review of a law that facially criminalizes
consensual sexual behavior.146
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has also approvingly cited
Lawrence’s exceptions paragraph in its entirety to support its judgment
that the North Carolina sodomy ban does not facially violate substantive
due process.147 Defendant Gregory Paul Whiteley appealed his conviction
under the North Carolina crime against nature statute arguing the statute
was facially unconstitutional. The appellate court charged that the
exceptions paragraph “clearly indicates that state regulation of sexual
conduct involving minors, non-consensual or coercive conduct, public
conduct, and prostitution falls outside the boundaries of the liberty interest
protecting personal relations and is therefore constitutionally
permissible.”148 Just as the Louisiana Supreme Court focused myopically
on whether a charging decision pursuant to a statute criminalizing
consensual sex violated Tina Thomas’s constitutional guarantee to liberty,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered the “regulation” of sexual
behavior in an analytic vacuum, paying no heed to whether the relevant
laws pursuant to which the state elects to “regulate” sexual conduct from
the exceptions paragraph criminalize private, consensual, nonprocreative
sex.149 Whiteley had been charged with second degree rape, second degree
142

Cook, 192 P.3d at 1086.
Id. at 1087.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 1088.
146
See id. (holding that “Cook failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing
that I.C. § 18–6605 is unconstitutional as applied to his case”) (emphasis added).
147
State v. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d 576, 579–582 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14–177.
148
Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 580.
149
State v. Thomas, 891 So.2d 1233, 1238 (La. 2005); Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at
580. The North Carolina Supreme Court has endorsed the approach taken by the court
of appeals in Whiteley by rejecting an as–applied challenge to the constitutionality of
the North Carolina crime against nature statute being used to adjudicate a fourteen
year old boy as delinquent for receiving fellatio from a twelve year old girl even
143
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sexual offense, and crimes against nature (all stemming from the same
alleged offense) but was only convicted on the sodomy charge.150
On appeal, Whiteley argued that the trial court’s jury instructions as
to the crime against nature statute violated the Lawrence rule because
jurors were not informed that the North Carolina sodomy ban should not
be construed to criminalize consensual nonprocreative intercourse, and
instead were told that they should return a guilty verdict on the crime
against nature charge if Whiteley “committed an unnatural sex act.”151
Although the appellate court found in Whiteley’s favor by holding that as
applied, his conviction pursuant to the North Carolina sodomy law was in
error, the case nevertheless illustrates the suboptimality of convicting
individuals for forcible nonvaginal sex, commercial nonvaginal sex,
public nonvaginal sex, or nonvaginal sex with minors pursuant to laws that
facially criminalize all nonvaginal intercourse.152
Perhaps most
troublingly, Whiteley demonstrates the possibility that laws
indiscriminately prohibiting sodomy (i.e., criminalizing the sexual
practice without clear statutory language stipulating the ban only applies
to forcible sex, etc.) may encourage overzealous prosecutors to obtain
convictions for crimes against nature as a consolation prize when they fail
– as the prosecution in Whiteley did – to prove conclusively the necessary
elements of other, more serious crimes, of which nonprocreative sex is
also an element.153
In construing Lawrence as prescribing as-applied inquiries into
whether prosecutorial and adjudicative choices in a given case do or do
not target regulable sexual behavior per the exceptions paragraph, states
permit the continued imposition of criminal sanctions on individuals
pursuant to statutes which are materially indistinguishable from the Texas
law characterized by the Supreme Court in Lawrence as invading the
autonomy of consenting adults over their private sexual lives.154 Refusing
though other state laws regulating sexual behavior do not impose criminal sanctions
for minors who have sex so long as they are less than three years apart in age solely
because the case, unlike Lawrence, “does involve minors.” In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d
920, 921–25 (N.C. 2007).
150
Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 578.
151
Id. at 581. As of at least 2019, the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions
now cite Whiteley and recommend that courts inform jurors hearing prosecutions for
crimes against nature that they must find both that the defendant committed an
“unnatural sex act” and that the activity involved sex with a minor, forcible sex, sex
for monetary remuneration, or public sex. NORTH CAROLINA CONFERENCE OF
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CRIMINAL CASES § 226.10A (2019) (Crime against Nature – Persons. G.S. 14-177.).
152
Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 582–583.
153
See id. at 578.
154
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). Of course, the Texas
statute at issue in Lawrence criminalized homosexual sodomy specifically, but the
Court went to substantial lengths in basing its decision to proscribe the enforcement
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to interpret Lawrence as facially invalidating statutes that clearly prohibit
private, consensual, nonprocreative sex (even if the statute is by
convention or rule no longer applied to such conduct) constructively
invites entrepreneurial prosecutors to continue charging individuals with
crimes against nature – in particular, as in Whiteley, when convicting on a
related offense might prove impracticable – in hopes that courts will be
sympathetic to their claims that the nonprocreative sex they have chosen
to prosecute satisfies one of the Lawrence exceptions.155 Further,
engaging in as-applied challenges to regulations of sodomy necessarily
demands highly individualized inquiries into the factual circumstances in
a given case to determine whether or not the behavior is permissibly
subject to prosecution and conviction per Lawrence. This vests
unwarranted discretion in the judiciary to distinguish constitutionally
worthy claims from frivolous ones, and may even lead to systematic
inequities should certain classes of defendants become more likely than
others to prevail on their as-applied challenges to prosecutions for crimes
against nature. By contrast, rather than opening a Pandora’s Box of ad hoc
judicial determinations regarding constitutional merit, parsing Lawrence
as categorically requiring nonenforcement of statutes that facially
criminalize conduct including private, consensual, nonprocreative
intercourse instead places the onus on legislators to enact prohibitory
statutes whose terms meet the minimum constitutional standards
associated with substantive due process.156

D. Collateral Enforcement of Sodomy Laws After Lawrence
In addition to the direct enforcement of sodomy laws that facially
criminalize the exact behavior prosecuted in Lawrence v. Texas, some
states impose collateral burdens on individuals with sodomy convictions
by making crimes against nature a registrable offense for their state’s sex
offender registry.157 This includes both direct registration requirements
for individuals with (pre- and post-Lawrence) in-state sodomy
convictions, as well as indirect registration requirements for those with

of the Texas law on due process rather than equal protection to clarify that the relevant
constitutional deficiency was the statute’s interference with private sexual autonomy
rather than the legal distinction based on sexual identity. See id.
155
Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d at 578.
156
See infra Part III–A.
157
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v) (making it a “dangerous
criminal offense” for which registration and community notification are required if an
individual was convicted under § 16–6–2, the provision of the Georgia code making
it a criminal offense if an individual “performs or submits to any sexual act involving
the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another,” and precisely the
statute at issue in Bowers); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23–3–430(C)(11) (making “buggery” a
registrable offense in South Carolina).
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out-of-state sodomy convictions via statutory terms that incorporate sex
offender registration criteria from other states.158 As a result, many
individuals incur separate, sequential burdens – arrest, trial, incarceration,
probation, and then registration – based on convictions pursuant to statutes
that on their face criminally prohibit private, consensual, nonprocreative
intercourse.159
These collateral consequences create significant
disruptions in the lives of individuals who – while their actions may be
consistent with the conduct deemed criminally regulable without violating
due process by the Supreme Court in Lawrence – were convicted using
statutory language that facially infringes the constitutional guarantee to
liberty in one’s private sexual affairs.160
Any criminal conviction involves collateral consequences.161 Crimes
that statutorily qualify for sex offender registration, however, impose
uniquely onerous additional costs on registrants for three reasons. First,
sex offense convictions trigger highly emotional reactions among the
public, and research suggests that the enhancement of punitive
consequences for sex crimes is rooted in emotional reactions to media
narratives of crimes involving sex as well as popular overestimation of
recidivism rates among those convicted of sex offenses.162 Second, federal
law dictates that sex offense convictions become extraordinarily public
affairs, as states are required to maintain a registry of individuals convicted
of sex offenses and to ensure that the information collected from
individuals convicted of sex offenses is “available on the Internet, in a
manner that is readily accessible to all jurisdictions and to the public.”163
158

See GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v) (directly listing sodomy as a
registrable offense); MISS. CODE ANN §§ 45–33–23(h)(xi), 97–29–59 (making
“unnatural intercourse” – defined as “the detestable and abominable crime against
nature committed with mankind or with a beast” – a registrable offense in Mississippi);
MISS. CODE ANN § 45–33–23(h)(xx) (requiring registration in Mississippi for “[a]ny
other offense resulting in a conviction in another jurisdiction which, if committed in
this state, would be deemed to be such a crime without regard to its designation
elsewhere”). The consequence of the former provision is to make out–of–state sodomy
convictions registrable in Mississippi even if they were not registrable in the state of
conviction. MISS. CODE ANN §§ 45–33–23(h)(xi), 97–29–59.
159
See generally MISS. CODE ANN §§ 45–33–23(h)(xi), 97–29–59; GA. CODE
ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23–3–430(C)(11); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14–177; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–6605; LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:89(A)(2) (2006).
160
See infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text.
161
See, e.g., Kathleen M. Olivares, et al., The Collateral Consequences of a
Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED.
PROB. 10, 10 (1996) (examining the manner in which state criminal codes create
collateral costs for those convicted of felonies).
162
James F. Quinn et al., Societal Reaction to Sex Offenders: A Review of the
Origins and Results of the Myths Surrounding Their Crimes and Treatment
Amenability, 25 DEVIANT BEHAV. 215, 217–226 (2004).
163
34 U.S.C. § 20912(a). The federal statute governing registration for
individuals convicted of sex offenses – known colloquially as the Sex Offender
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Third, the period during which registration is compulsory for those
convicted of sex offenses can last from fifteen years to the remainder of
the individual’s life.164 Likely as a result of the distinct burden associated
with sex offense convictions, research demonstrates that individuals
convicted of sex offenses and required to register experience a host of
negative collateral consequences in their lives.165 In a 2005 survey of
persons with sex offense convictions, at least one fifth of respondents
reported that they experienced either the loss of their job, denial of a
promotion at work, loss or denial of a place to live, being treated rudely in
a public place, having lost a friend who found out about their registration,
being harassed in person, or receiving harassing or threatening telephone
calls or emails as a result of their registration status.166 This litany of
ancillary ramifications associated with sex offender registration and
notification presents significant barriers to the social and psychological
reintegration of individuals convicted of sex offenses into the community
after their incarceration.167

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) – punishes noncompliance with a ten
percent reduction in Byrne grants to the state. Id. § 20927(a) (establishing the
information to be collected from individuals convicted of sex offenses and included
in the state registry). Jurisdictions are required to exempt from disclosure the identity
of sex offense victims, the social security number of individuals convicted of sex
offenses, and information regarding arrests of individuals convicted of sex offenses
that did not lead to convictions and are given the option to exempt other information
such as the employer and educational institution of individuals convicted of sex
offenses. Id. § 20920(b)–(c).
164
Id. § 20915(a) (delineating that the required registration period for those
convicted of sex offenses differs based on whether they are classified as having
committed a Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III offense, in escalating order of seriousness).
Individuals convicted of sex offenses and required to register pursuant to SORNA can
reduce their required registration period if they maintain what the statute calls a “clean
record.” Id. § 20915(b).
165
See Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender
Registration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 67, 74–78 (2005).
166
Id. at 75. For some of the items on the survey – loss of job, loss or denial of
a place to live, having lost friends, and being harassed in person – the proportion of
respondents who reported such negative experiences was nearly or greater than one
half, and over ten percent of respondents reported having been assaulted or asked to
leave a business as a result of their registration status. Id. These survey results were
largely replicated in subsequent qualitative research, as well. Richard Tewksbury &
Matthew Lees, Perceptions of Sex Offender Registration: Collateral Consequences
and Community Experiences, 26 SOC. SPECTRUM 309, 331 (2006). Research also
suggests negative emotional consequences for the family members of individuals
convicted of sex offenses due to the registration and community notification
requirements. Richard G. Zevitz et al., Sex Offender Community Notification:
Managing High Risk Criminals or Exacting Further Vengeance?, 18 BEHAV. SCI. L.
375, 381 (2000).
167
See id.
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States violate the Lawrence rule by collaterally sanctioning
individuals convicted pursuant to statutes facially criminalizing private,
consensual sodomy through sex offender registration and notification
requirements. Likewise – as illustrated in ongoing litigation surrounding
Mississippi’s requirement that individuals convicted of sodomy register as
sex offenders – procedural rules governing eligibility for post-conviction
relief have the potential to thwart legal attempts to obtain judicial
exemption of persons convicted under laws facially criminalizing sodomy
from the registration requirement.168 In Doe v. Hood, Arthur Doe sought
to challenge his inclusion on the Mississippi sex offender registry (MSOR)
based on his 1977 conviction pursuant to the state’s law criminalizing
“unnatural intercourse.”169 While a federal district court agreed that the
unnatural intercourse statute “appears to be unconstitutional” and that Doe
“should not be subjected to the stigmatizing requirements imposed by the
MSOR,” the court deferred judgment on the constitutionality of the statute
until a state court determines whether Doe is barred from relief since he
has not met the requirement that his original prosecution conclude through
a favorable determination under the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Heck v. Humphrey.170 The outcome for Arthur Doe, then, turns
on whether Mississippi courts agree with the state that Doe has an avenue
for habeas relief in state courts via the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral
Relief Act, in which case federal claims related to his prosecution and
conviction would be barred by Heck pending the outcome of a state appeal
for post-conviction relief.171 Individuals convicted pursuant to
presumptively unconstitutional sodomy bans and forced to register as sex
offenders thus face a daunting procedural obstacle to receiving exemptions
from registration and notification requirements as the prospect of a Heck
bar precluding their claim significantly deters affected parties from
seeking relief.
168

Doe v. Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d 749, 754–756 (S.D. Miss. 2018).
Id. at 750–51; MISS. CODE ANN. § 97–29–59.
170
Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 751–756; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–
487 (1994). There is a prodigious amount of legal scholarship criticizing Heck on
various grounds, including negative evaluations of the favorable termination rule for
creating unreasonable complications if individuals incarcerated in state prisons seek
post–conviction relief (typically via 42 U.S.C. § 1983) but lack access to habeas relief.
See Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121
HARV. L. REV. 868, 889 (2008) (arguing that federal claims should not be barred for
imprisoned persons in state courts if they are unable to pursue state habeas relief).
171
Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 755–56; MISS. CODE ANN. § 99–39–5 (2013).
Specifically, the Mississippi statute governing post–conviction relief demands that
motions for post–conviction relief after a guilty plea (as in Doe’s case) be filed within
three years after a conviction is entered, but the state supreme court has exempted
claims regarding fundamental rights from this procedural limitation. Id. § 99–39–5(2);
Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503, 508 (Miss. 2010).
169
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Other states employ similar statutory measures to target conduct
involving consensual, nonprocreative intercourse for particular
condemnation and interpose the state judiciary to arbitrate claims by
individuals seeking exemption from state sex offender registration
requirements. Until 2010, Louisiana made the solicitation of anal or oral
sex a registrable offense (crime against nature by solicitation), but did not
require registration for the solicitation of vaginal intercourse (chargeable
only under the state’s prostitution statute).172 In Doe v. Jindal, the court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that the state’s practice of having
“created two classifications of similarly (in fact, identical) situated
individuals who were treated differently (only one class is subject to
mandatory sex offender registration)” bore “no rational relation to any
legitimate government objective,” and thus failed rational basis review.173
Though this prohibition involved commercial sex – approved for
regulation by Lawrence’s exceptions paragraph – the case is instructive
for discerning the state’s attitude toward oral and anal sex versus vaginal
intercourse and the differential rationale for making solicitation of one a
registrable offense versus the other. In Doe, the state attempted to justify
its enhanced treatment of crimes against nature by solicitation versus
prostitution “because Crime Against Nature by Solicitation is a lesser
offense to which other registrable offenses can be pleaded down to.”174
This argument, which, among other things, traffics in the dissemination of
hackneyed stereotypes about same-sex intimacy and AIDS and was
characterized as “patent hypothetical speculation” by the Court in Doe,
does not persuasively justify the state’s preferred policy of punishing
conduct involving nonprocreative intercourse more stringently than
vaginal sex.175
Although the Louisiana state legislature amended its statutory
framework governing registration after Doe v. Jindal to allow individuals
convicted of a crime against nature by solicitation to petition for relief
from registration and notification requirements, the current registration
statute nevertheless subjects the decision whether to grant such petitioners
relief to a judge in the court where those individuals were originally
convicted.176 Thus, after differentially burdening individuals convicted for
solicitation of nonvaginal sex for years after Lawrence– rather than
automatically rescinding the registration and notification requirement for
172

Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995, 998–99 (E.D. La. 2012).
Id. at 1007.
174
Id. at 1008.
175
See, e.g., Celia Kitzinger & Elizabeth Peel, The De–Gaying and Re–Gaying
of AIDS: Contested Homophobias in Lesbian and Gay Awareness Training, 16
DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 173, 177 (2005) (discussing the historical tendency of associating
HIV/AIDS with gay sex practices and of portraying “gay men…as a dangerous threat
to public safety”).
176
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(F)(3)(a).
173
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individuals convicted of a crime against nature by solicitation prior to the
statutory equalization between solicitation of vaginal and nonvaginal
intercourse – the Louisiana code now places the responsibility on
convicted persons themselves to petition for relief.177 This burden not only
extends to Louisiana residents with convictions for crimes against nature
by solicitation, but also levies convoluted obligations on individuals who
move to another state after a conviction for crimes against nature by
solicitation in Louisiana and must then petition for deregistration in their
new home state.178
Precise, systematic data on the number of registrants per state who
have registered as sex offenders due to a sodomy conviction are hard to
come by due to significant non-transparent registry data in some states.179
Although Mississippi does not offer a comprehensive database of
registered sex offenders online,180 the Court in Doe v. Hood noted that
“[a]pproximately 35 Mississippi residents have convictions for Unnatural
Intercourse or an out-of-state statute that criminalizes oral or anal sex with
no additional elements” and that “[o]f these, about 22 individuals are
registered on the MSOR.”181 Georgia, however, both requires individuals

177

See id.
See Doe v. Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d 749, 751–52 (S.D. Miss. 2018) (describing
the process by which a class of individuals convicted for crimes against nature by
solicitation in Louisiana eventually reached an agreement with the state in Doe v.
Hood to have themselves and other individuals with Louisiana “CANS” convictions
removed from the Mississippi sex offender registry).
179
See, e.g., Sex Offender Registry, ALA. L. ENF’T AGENCY,
https://www.alea.gov/node/270 [https://perma.cc/3K4H-7PRY] (last visited February
5, 2021) (allowing users to search for registered offenders by address, name, city,
compliance status, or email address, but neither allowing users to search for registered
offenders by convicted offense nor supplying a downloadable file with all offenders
by state). A representative from the ALEA confirmed by email that the agency does
not provide a statewide list of registrants without a formal records request. E-mail
from ALEA Rep. to Jordan Carr Peterson, Assistant Professor Pol. Sci., Sch. Pub. &
Int’l Affs., N.C. State U. (Oct. 27, 2020) (on file with author); E-mail from ALEA
Rep. to Jordan Carr Peterson, Assistant Professor Pol. Sci., Sch. Pub. & Int’l Affs.,
N.C. State U. (Oct. 28, 2020) (on file with author). In some other states that continue
to enforce facial criminal prohibitions on crimes against nature against individuals
who engage in behavior from the exceptions paragraph in Lawrence, a sodomy
conviction is not registrable. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–208.6(5) (delineating the
registrable “sexually violent offense[s]” which include rape, sexual battery, sexual
exploitation of a minor, and incest, among others, but exclude crimes against nature,
despite sodomy remaining a criminal offense in the state).
180
See Mississippi Sex Offender Registry, STATE OF MISS. DEPT. OF PUB.
SAFETY, http://state.sor.dps.ms.gov/SearchOffender.aspx [https://perma.cc/YT9948UJ] (last visited February 5, 2021) (allowing users to search for individuals on the
MSOR by name, within a geographic radius around an address or zip code, or in a
given county).
181
Hood, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 753.
178
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convicted of sodomy to register as sex offenders182 and makes its sex
offender registry publicly available online in its entirety.183 Data from the
Georgia Sex Offender Registry indicate that over 250 individuals are
registered as sex offenders in the state due to a sodomy conviction, and
that at least one person in ninety of Georgia’s 189 counties is registered as
a sex offender stemming from a sodomy conviction.184 Of these
individuals, nearly three quarters (73.5%) were convicted for sodomy
within Georgia, whereas the remainder (26.5%) were convicted of sodomy
or its equivalent out of state but nevertheless required to register in
Georgia, including states such as Maryland, New York, and Virginia, in
which laws facially criminalizing sodomy have been repealed.185 In the
figure below, I present a graphical representation of the Georgia sex
offender registry data that reflects the individuals listed on the Georgia
registry based on sodomy. Convictions are not racially representative of
either the registry or the overall state population.186 Among those on the
registry for sodomy, 50.2% were reported as White, whereas 49.8% were
reported as Black. This suggests Black individuals are overrepresented
among sodomy registrants in Georgia compared to their share of the
broader population in the state and the total population on the registry:
statewide, Georgia is 57.8% White and 31.9% Black, and among

182

GA. CODE ANN. § 42–1–12(a)(10)(B)(v).
See Georgia Sex Offender Registry, GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
https://gbi.georgia.gov/services/georgia-sex-offender-registry
[https://perma.cc/NWU2-GLYK] (last visited February 5, 2021).
184
Id. The nomenclature for the sodomy convictions in the Georgia registry is
somewhat inconsistent, but 257 of the crimes listed in the database and for which
individuals have currently registered as sex offenders contain the word “sodomy” or
its statutory equivalent. Id. This includes 35 registrants whose crime is listed as
“Sodomy,” 171 registrants whose crime is listed as “Sodomy – Felony,” and scattered
other offenses that either specify the degree of the crime in one of various forms (e.g.,
“Sodomy 1st,” “Sodomy 1st Deg,” “Sodomy 1st Degree,” “Sodomy I,” etc.), contain
two offenses (e.g., “Sodomy Kidnapping,” “Sodomy Sexual Assault,” etc.), or go by
a different name entirely (“crimes against nature,” as this is the statutory offense in
Louisiana, where two of the convictions occurred). Id. Since the Georgia database
does not supply the statute pursuant to which individuals were convicted, it is
impossible to discern much more about the circumstances giving rise to the offenses
coded “Sodomy” or “Sodomy – Felony.” Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. Of the more than 23,000 individuals listed on the registry, all but 182 were
reported as being either Black or White. Id. These 182 individuals of other races are
included in the denominator to calculate the percentages appearing in the figure, but I
do not present percentage data broken out by offense for other races due to the small
subsample. Id.
183
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individuals registered as sex offenders, 53.5% are White and 45.7% are
Black.
Figure: Racial Makeup of Georgia Sex Offender Registry
The vertical bars indicate the proportion of individuals who are White
or Black (1) statewide according to the 2019 Census estimate; (2) on
the sex offender registry (SOR); (3) among individuals with sodomy
convictions on the SOR; (4) among individuals with child molestation

convictions on the SOR; and (5) with computer pornography
convictions on the SOR, all as of February 2021.

Individuals on the Georgia sex offender registry with sodomy
convictions reported as Black are also overrepresented compared with the
individuals compelled to register due to convictions for child molestation
or computer pornography, among whom 39.9% and 14.4% were reported
as Black, respectively.
Though the data presented here represent only an exploratory glimpse
at the state of sex offender registration in Georgia, these descriptive
findings indicate that Black individuals in the state make up a
disproportionate share of individuals on the sex offender registry
altogether, as well as a disproportionate share of individuals registered as
sex offenders due to sodomy convictions.187 These racial disparities
187
These data are, of course, consistent with broader, prominent scholarly
narratives regarding mass incarceration as a tool of racial oppression. See generally
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (suggesting that “tough–on–crime” policies, in particular
those initiated by the Nixon and Reagan administrations, have had profound and
disproportionately negative effects on Black Americans).
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suggest that there may be significant social inequities perpetuated by the
implementation of sex offender registration and notification requirements,
and future scholarship would do well to examine these inequities
systematically. This, alongside the procedural impediments for individuals
with sodomy convictions seeking deregistration discussed earlier, suggests
that the continued imposition of sex offender registration and notification
requirements on individuals convicted pursuant to statutes facially
criminalizing consensual sodomy is by no means a trivial burden. Rather,
the requirement that individuals with convictions under consensual
sodomy bans register as sex offenders is at best constitutionally suspect as
it represents the collateral enforcement of a public policy deemed
unconstitutional in Lawrence.188 Furthermore, at this juncture, scholars
remain unable to estimate precisely the scope of the deprivations occurring
through such registration and notification requirements due to widespread
unavailability of comprehensive sex offender registry data as well as the
tendency of such requirements to evade review through procedural
constraints on post-conviction relief.189

E. Sodomy Laws and the Persistence of Stigmatization
Even in the absence of direct or collateral enforcement, the presence
of laws criminalizing private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse on
American statute books advances a retrograde conception of gay men and
lesbians as a criminal class.190 Well before Lawrence was decided,
scholars recognized the employment of criminal prohibitions on sodomy
as a means through which the state could enshrine the social otherness of
gay men and lesbians in law.191 Criminalizing the modal form of sex for
gay men already cast a long shadow of opprobrium on a marginalized
population when such statutes were considered constitutionally sound.192
Indeed, among the most persuasive explanations for the sweeping
language in the Lawrence decision is that “the very fact of criminalization,
even unaccompanied by any appreciable number of prosecutions, can cast
already misunderstood or despised individuals into grossly stereotyped
roles, which become the source and justification for treating those

188

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003).
See HARV. L. REV. supra note 170, at 875.
190
See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
“Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 103, 112–13 (2000)
(describing the function of laws criminalizing sodomy as establishing a formal sexual
hierarchy in which gay men and lesbians are a criminal class).
191
See id. at 114 (“The symbolic function of sodomy laws is similar to Jim Crow
laws in that a primary purpose of both types of law is to condemn an entire class of
Americans as immoral, inferior, and not deserving of society’s tolerance and
protection.”).
192
See id.
189
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individuals less well than others.”193 Even today, nearly twenty years after
Lawrence, some states refuse to repeal statutes indiscriminately
criminalizing sodomy under a constitutional regime that maintains
“[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”194 It is
exceedingly difficult to justify the decision to let private, consensual
sodomy remain a criminal offense per the terms of state law if the statutes
serve little purpose other than recreational stigmatization.
Moreover, law is an expression of public values, and it bears
consideration exactly which values criminal prohibitions on sodomy
advance.195 Statutes criminalizing sodomy – even if entirely unenforced –
represent the formalization of public contempt for the sexual practices
most common among a minority subgroup of the population whose youth
regularly experience verbal harassment, physical assault, or rejection by
their families,196 and are nearly five times as likely to commit and attempt
suicide.197 Speaking after the repeal of his state’s crimes against nature
statute in 2014, gay Virginia State Senator Adam Ebbin cast his chamber’s
unanimous decision to abandon the discriminatory and sexually restrictive
policy in terms that demonstrate he understood the public values
undergirding repeal: “The law was a terrible, symbolic insult … Once the
governor signs it, I am glad that all consenting adults will finally be treated
as adults.”198 Although the preceding subsections of this Article establish
with certainty that laws facially proscribing sodomy are still directly and
collaterally enforced, even unenforced regulations of private, consensual,
nonprocreative intercourse would further no ends other than the continued
stigmatization of all individuals who engage in same-sex intimacy.199

193

Tribe, supra note 49 at 1896.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
195
William J. Hall, Psychosocial Risk and Protective Factors for Depression
Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Queer Youth: A Systematic Review, 65 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 263, 264–65 (2018).
196
Id.
197
Zachary Giano, et al., Identifying Distinct Subgroups of Lesbian, Gay, and
Bisexual Youth for Suicide Risk: A Latent Profile Analysis, 67 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
194, 194 (2020).
198
Lou Chibbaro Jr., Va. Lawmakers Repeal Sodomy Ban in Unanimous Vote,
WASH. BLADE (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/03/07/valawmakers-repeal-sodomy-ban-unanimous-vote/ [https://perma.cc/7Q57-QPUE].
199
Ragusa & Birkhead, see e.g., supra note 2, at 745.
194
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IV. PATHS FORWARD: HARMONIZING POLICY WITH THE LETTER
AND SPIRIT OF LAWRENCE
A. Legislative Remedies
The simplest solution to criminal prohibitions on sodomy lingering
in state codes is for state legislatures to repeal the prohibitory statutes. This
has already been accomplished in a handful of states that continued to have
enforceable sodomy bans at the time Lawrence was decided, as detailed in
Part II-B above,200 and repeal is well within the powers of those state
legislatures in jurisdictions that continue to enforce statutory prohibitions
on sodomy despite the constitutional shadow looming over such laws.201
For reasons I discuss subsequently, however, legislative repeal of sodomy
laws represents a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ensuring the
entire footprint of criminal prohibitions on consensual sexual behavior is
erased due to regimes of collateral enforcement that burden individual
liberty based on sodomy convictions indirectly.
Repeal has several advantages over judicial action. First, legislative
repeal lends democratic legitimacy to the decriminalization of consensual
sexual behavior. Repeal sends an unequivocal signal from the branch of
government with the lawmaking prerogative in a separation of powers
framework that the state has no intention of imposing criminal sanctions
on individuals for their private, consensual sexual conduct. Second,
legislative repeal would, in all likelihood, accelerate the decriminalization
of sodomy as state legislatures have the capacity to remove statutory
prohibitions from their state’s code effective immediately. This stands in
contrast to the piecemeal abandonment of legislation criminalizing
sodomy after Lawrence, which has resulted in the patchwork quilt of
(non)compliance conditions across the country and which has continued
to prove so catastrophic for individuals who engage in sexual conduct
prosecuted under sodomy bans.202 Further, in addition to ending direct
enforcement, repeal would swiftly contribute to reducing the
stigmatization of same-sex sexual intimacy described in Part II-E. Third,
legislative repeal of sodomy prohibitions can end the criminalization of
consensual sexual behavior with finality. Since legislation – unlike a
judicial decision – does not grant dissatisfied parties the right to appeal or
use other dilatory tactics to avoid compliance, a legislative determination

200

See supra Part II-B.
See e.g., Staff Reports, Md. sodomy law officially repealed, WASH. BLADE
(October 1, 2020) https://www.washingtonblade.com/2020/10/01/md-sodomy-lawofficially-repealed/ [https://perma.cc/3DSV-VVGC].
202
See supra notes 89–102 (listing states which have not repealed sodomy laws).
201
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to cease the criminal prohibition of sodomy would likely represent the
final word on the subject.203
Legislative repeal of sodomy prohibitions is an important step toward
ensuring the public policy of regulating sexual behavior becomes more
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Lawrence holding. Legislation
repealing sodomy bans, however, is on its own insufficient because simply
repealing an existing prohibition fails to remedy inequities in the justice
system stemming from collateral enforcement as described in Part II,
subpart D above.204 In particular, a repeal bill on its own would fail to end
the practice of requiring that individuals convicted pursuant to statutes
criminalizing sodomy prior to repeal to register as sex offenders.205 State
legislatures, then, should also enact legislation unambiguously
establishing that the state forbids its justice department from requiring
individuals to register with their state’s sex offender registry due to
convictions for sodomy or crimes against nature, and specifying that
individuals are not required to register as sex offenders whether the
sodomy convictions occurred in state or out of state, and whether their
convictions were before or after Lawrence. Legislation should also
retroactively deregister any individuals with convictions pursuant to
categorical sodomy bans rather than placing the burden to deregister on
registrants themselves.206 This legislative modification of qualifying
offenses to state sex offender registries is a necessary additional step
toward guaranteeing that both direct and collateral enforcement of statutes
prohibiting sodomy come to an end.

203
The Legislative Process, U.S. H.R., https://www.house.gov/the-houseexplained/the-legislative-process [https://perma.cc/LT8H-H4VK] (last visited May
19, 2021). The sole exceptions to this claim would be if either (1) repeal legislation
delayed or deferred decriminalization for any reason; or (2) a group of legislators
elected subsequent to the repeal of a sodomy ban made the choice to recriminalize
sodomy via a new statute. Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws: History and Strategy That
Led to the Lawrence Decision, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/getting-ridsodomy-laws-history-and-strategy-led-lawrence-decision [https://perma.cc/LX5SRR5J] (last visited May 19, 2021). The political logic behind the first possibility is
unclear, and I do not believe such hypothetical legislation would be properly classified
as a repeal bill in any event. The second possibility seems unlikely for legislators
concerned with the reelection imperative given the political unpopularity of
criminalizing sodomy according to a series of public opinion polls conducted by
Gallup, in which a majority of respondents have not supported making consensual gay
or lesbian sex illegal since the late 1980s, and in whose most recent wave fully 72
percent of respondents oppose the criminalization of gay sex. Gay and Lesbian Rights,
GALLUP,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay–lesbian–rights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/R4W6-PYZ9] (last visited January 30, 2021).
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B. Judicial Remedies
While legislative actions to repeal statutory sodomy prohibitions and
prevent collateral enforcement of sodomy regulations are the most
straightforward solution to the enduring afterlife of criminal prohibitions
on sodomy, the judiciary can also act to alleviate the burden on those
deprived of rights and liberties in violation of Lawrence.207 Namely,
courts should interpret the Lawrence decision at its word, and maintain
that the criminal regulation of consensual sodomy facially violates the
constitutional guarantee to substantive due process.208 Should the
opportunity arise, the Supreme Court itself could articulate that Lawrence
facially invalidated the Texas homosexual conduct law and mandate the
nonenforcement of statutes criminalizing private, consensual sodomy.209
This leaves in place regulations specifically enumerating only those sorts
of practices deemed constitutionally eligible for criminal prohibitions in
the exceptions paragraph, but forces states only to charge and convict
pursuant to legislation that cannot be read to impose criminal sanctions for
private, consensual, nonprocreative intercourse.210 Likewise, the Court
could read Lawrence as prohibiting not only the direct enforcement of
criminal prohibitions on sodomy, but also the indirect enforcement via sex
offender registration and notification requirements.211 To accomplish the
latter, the Court need simply interpret the Lawrence holding as proscribing
the imposition of any criminal or administrative burden, including but not
limited to direct prosecution as well as the onerous demands associated
with sex offender registration detailed in Part II, subpart D above.212
Although the implementation of a holding along these lines might involve
the same sorts of complications described in Part II, subpart A due to
judicial passivity and decentralized political authority, a judicial
reimagining of Lawrence that clarifies the operative scope of the holding
as rendering laws indiscriminately criminalizing nonprocreative sexual
intercourse constitutionally intolerable could substantially reduce the
semantic ambiguity associated with the original decision and thus leave
far less discretion for those implementing the holding to evade its
requirements.
207
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In addition to action in the appellate judiciary, trial courts also have
the capacity to minimize avoidance of the Lawrence rule in states where
prosecutors seek to continue charging and convicting individuals pursuant
to statutes criminalizing sodomy. 213 In particular, trial courts could
exercise their equitable discretion to enter permanent injunctive relief
requiring nonenforcement of any statutes that could be read to impose
criminal sanctions for private, consensual, nonprocreative sexual
intercourse.214 Likewise, either state or federal courts could enjoin state
departments of justice from requiring individuals with sodomy convictions
to register as sex offenders as doing so imposes a burden prohibited by
Lawrence.
For the reasons discussed earlier, I believe legislative efforts to
harmonize state policies with the letter and spirit of the Lawrence decision
would provide the most efficacious solution to the persistence of sodomy
regulations.215 It may be, however, that certain state legislatures
demonstrate little interest in (or actively oppose) formally decriminalizing
private, consensual, nonprocreative sexual intercourse within their
jurisdictions. For instance, the Louisiana House of Representatives
rejected a bill in 2014 that would have removed consensual, same-sex
intercourse from their state code’s list of crimes against nature by a vote
of 66 to 27.216 In such cases of legislative intransigence, courts offer a
secondary venue in which litigants have the capacity to press for
modifications their legislatures are unwilling to grant.

213
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over such remedies lies outside the scope of this Article. See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 418, 419 (2017)
(arguing injunctive relief should not bind groups or individuals outside the parties to
specific litigation); but see Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1088–99 (2018) (contending that in some cases nationwide
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V. CONCLUSION
The criminal regulation of sodomy is rooted in centuries of
homophobia, and it survives today.217 Although the Lawrence decision
maintained – in no uncertain terms – that laws facially criminalizing
sodomy burdened fundamental constitutional rights, linguistic imprecision
in the decision afforded pro-enforcement proponents sufficient latitude to
prop up a zombie regime of presumptively unconstitutional statutes.218
Likewise, the stubborn persistence of criminal prohibitions on sodomy via
both direct and collateral enforcement draws attention to the inherent
challenges for effective implementation of judicial decisions in American
government.219 The deliberate fragmentation of political authority serves
important public interests,220 but permits – or even invites –
noncompliance given dedicated and geographically concentrated
resistance. Lawrence, then, left unfinished business in its wake.
The continued enforcement of laws facially criminalizing sodomy
proceeds by claiming that Lawrence only demands judicial interference
with sodomy convictions if such statutes have been enforced against
private, consensual sexual activity between adults, regardless how
narrowly the statutory terms are drawn.221 This claim rests on the implicit
assumption that society can trust law enforcement, prosecutors, and
judicial officials to decide equitably that the application of categorical
sodomy bans does not burden the constitutional guarantee to liberty. 222 In
light of well-documented limitations on the promotion of sexual freedom
and gay rights by both courts and law enforcement in the past, this
assumption is ill-advised.223 Rather than placing our collective faith in the
equitable enforcement of statutes that criminalize private, consensual,
nonprocreative sex on their face, Lawrence demands the nonenforcement
217
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of such laws regardless of the conduct enforcement is intended to target.224
To maintain the direct enforcement of laws facially criminalizing sodomy,
as well as the imposition of collateral consequences for sodomy
convictions through mandatory registration and notification in a public
repository intended to deter violent sex crimes, is constitutionally
unsustainable as continued application of such laws is inconsistent with
the most rudimentary conception of individual liberty.225 Legislative
repeal of statutes facially criminalizing sodomy coupled with appropriate
reforms of statutory sex offender registration requirements represents the
most effective means to finish, finally, what Lawrence started.
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